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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Delmege Trimble is a CIA intelligence officer.

25X1 [redacted] MORI/ HRP PARTS OF THIS PAGE

Clyde R. Heffter writes from his several years of experience as a CIA requirements officer.

Joseph Becker is a member of the CIA Management Staff currently specializing in applications of automatic equipment.

25X1 [redacted] is a polyglot scholar and veteran CIA officer.

25X1 [redacted] a cultural anthropologist with service in both government and non-government overseas programs, is now with the ICA in Liberia.

25X1 [redacted] is a CIA intelligence officer with wartime service in the south Pacific.

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A once sensational and mysterious intelligence betrayal is examined in the perspective of time for motivation and key circumstances.

THE DEFECTIONS OF DR. JOHN

Delmege Trimble

Rain streaked the streets of Berlin, splashed on darkened houses, glistened in the light from an East-West border checkpoint. A sedan rolled up, its tires singing on the wet pavement. A customs guard sauntered out. For a moment there was only the throb of the engine, a murmur of conversation, the rhythmic click of the windshield wipers. Then the wave of a hand, and the car rolled across the Sandkrug Bridge into the darkness of East Berlin.

A simple incident on this warm, wet night of 20 July 1954, the decennial of a more famous 20 July. Simple, but so fraught with significance for Germany and the West that Chancellor Adenauer called it "terrifying." Dr. Otto John, president of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, had defected. He was the most important Westerner fallen into Communist hands since the two British diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean, had vanished from London in 1951, and far more important than they in point of implications for intelligence.

The puzzle was—and to some still is—the reason why, the causes behind the eastward flight of the Federal Republic's internal security chief in the company of a trumpet-playing gynecologist, a Dr. Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. The contemporary explanations ranged the spectrum. The easiest one, that Wohlgemuth was a Soviet agent who had drugged John and abducted him, foundered on facts that gradually came to light. Some said that John, a mixed-up idealist, had been spurred across the border by a misguided concept of political morality. Some regarded him as a victim of machinations on the part of the neo-Nazis and clerical and other reactionary circles around Chancellor Adenauer. His flight was pictured by

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others as that of a desperate man whose past was about to catch up with him. Yet others called him a long-time traitor and informer, even a secret Communist fanatic.

There were prejudicial grounds for some of the least pretty interpretations. John's weaknesses for alcohol and the opposite sex were well known, his favorite sport when pixilated being to snap the elastic of women's brassieres. It was persistently rumored that he was a double agent or a homosexual, and he certainly had an affinity for too many characters with one or both of these qualifications. Aside from his companion Wohlgemuth, who had connections with the East Berlin Charité Hospital and made no secret of his Communist sympathies, John was on good terms with Soviet agent Max Wonsig, blown at the Willi Kucher spy trial, and more notably with one Baron Wolfgang Gans Edler Herr von und zu Putlitz. Von und zu Putlitz had been a prewar British agent in the Nazi Foreign Office, whisked to the safety of England in 1938; subsequently he worked in the United States for OWI until he was fired and his valet had to support him by tending bar; later he returned to British employ in Germany; and in 1950 he started working for the Communists in East Berlin.

Yet the stereotype of the weak man made vulnerable by his lusts or corrupted by bad company is not one that fits the Otto John picture. And all the other theses, each arguable, strike only tangentially at the truth. Erich Ollenhauer may have come closer when he remarked, after John redefected and began to show increasing signs of a persecution and Messiah complex, "This is a case for the psychiatrists rather than the politicians." We cannot even now arrive at anything like a tidy analysis of the case, but we can achieve some understanding of it by tracing John's propensities during the Nazi and Nuremberg eras, reviewing the circumstances of his unlikely appointment and ineffectual tenure as president of the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, and examining in detail his behavior just before and after his defection on that 1954 anniversary of the unsuccessful 20 July anti-Hitler coup.[1]

[1] Except as otherwise indicated, the authority for factual statements in the following account rests in classified documents in U.S., [redacted] intelligence files.

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Role in the Anti-Nazi Underground

Otto John was born in 1909. Two friendships from his early life remained of importance in his adult career and were to play a part in the events of July 1954. During his school days at Wiesbaden in the mid-twenties he became a close chum of Wolfgang Hoefer, son of the school principal. The intensity of German schoolboy friendships is reflected in the eventual tragedy that flowered from this early acquaintance. Hoefer, whose mother was Jewish, emigrated to the United States in the late 1930's. He changed his name to Hoffer, became a U.S. citizen and a soldier. In 1945 he was sent to Germany and renewed his friendship with Otto John. In 1954, upon John's defection, he committed suicide.

An emotionally more important relationship for Otto was that with his brother Hans, another marked for tragedy. Hans, the younger, brighter, and sturdier, was the extrovert doer, Otto the troubled dreamer. Otto felt no fraternal jealousy; he adored the younger brother who, as long as he lived, supplied the balance Otto needed. Hans was to be tortured to death in the aftermath of the abortive July 1944 coup.

Otto studied for a career in the foreign service, mastering Spanish, French, and English. But when Hitler came to power membership in the Nazi Party became a prerequisite for aspirants to the foreign service, and he shifted to international law. Never a member of any political party (though after the war he once referred to himself as a quondam Socialist), he said his convictions were a blend of monarchism, old-fashioned liberalism, and anti-Nazism. He received the doctorate in law from Frankfurt University in 1935.

By 1936 both John brothers were in Berlin. Hans was studying law at Berlin University. Otto served for two years without pay at Tempelhof Airdrome to qualify for final state law examinations in the service of Lufthansa. In 1937 he became assistant legal counsel, under Klaus Bonhoeffer, of the rapidly expanding civil airline. He was now in a position to do something positive about his anti-Nazi convictions. Through Klaus and his brother Dietrich, a Lutheran minister, he entered one of the circles that later were to band in the conspiracy against Hitler. An airline with routine flights into foreign countries was a convenient front for a conspiracy against a

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totalitarian regime.[2] Klaus Bonhoeffer assigned Otto to several courier runs.

When World War II broke in September 1939 Hans John went into the Luftwaffe as a lieutenant, but Otto remained with Lufthansa. That autumn he established connections with such anti-Nazis as the Social Democrat Wilhelm Leuschner and Col. General von Beck. Prince Louis Ferdinand, grandson of the Kaiser, had quit his job in a Ford plant in the United States to work for Lufthansa, and Otto John, along with Johannes Popitz, the Prussian Finance Minister, became a chief promoter of the Prince's pretensions to the throne in Carl Goerdeler's early schemes for a Hohenzollern restoration.[3] Louis Lochner, former chief of the Berlin Bureau of the Associated Press, said that on several occasions he accompanied John to meetings in Berlin of the Goerdeler and Louis Ferdinand groups.

Death was to sluff most of Otto's co-conspirators off the stage long before his own desertion, whether through natural causes, official executions, or the goon squads rampant at Germany's last gasp. But Louis Ferdinand remained a member of the cast through the last act. John cultivated him not only because he and his wife Kira, a former Grand Duchess of Russia, were very pleasant social companions but also because John, with his royalist inclinations, was flattered at being allowed to address the Prince by his intimate family nickname, "Lulu."

Beyond these contacts with conspiracy and his flights to neutral countries, Otto's specific resistance activities during this early period are unknown. In 1941 he passed considerable classified information about the Luftwaffe to U.S. correspondent Lochner. Strained attempts have been made to link him a little later with Rote Kapelle, the Communist radio-espionage group active in Berlin in 1941–42. No evidence is avail-

[2] Many clandestine interests capitalized on the advantages of this airline's international flights: Admiral Wilhelm Canaris' Abwehr faction, carrying on its own intrigues against the Nazis, had planted agents in it; Himmler's SS and the Gestapo had both infiltrated it; and the Soviets are believed to have recruited a pilot on the Berlin-Moscow run, a man named Radunsk.

[3] Gerhard Ritter, *The German Resistance*, pp. 191–2.

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able to support any such connection, although it has been taken for granted that his brother Hans had Communist affiliations.

When eyebrows were raised over the appearance of the healthy Otto in mufti, he entered the Abwehr, likely on Goerdeler's suggestion and through the good offices of General Oster, the activist conspirator under Admiral Canaris. He was assigned to Abwehrstelle Stettin but told that his primary mission was to seek better surrender terms for Germany once Hitler was removed, using his Abwehr commission simply as cover. Threads linking the various opposition groups were now being slowly knit, and John probably provided liaison among those in the Abwehr, in the Army High Command, around Leuschner and Julius Leber, Louis Ferdinand, etc., whose heretofore diffuse activity was manifest in the ineffectual half-dozen different attempts to remove Hitler between 1939 and 1943.

The year 1942 was eventful for him. He was using business trips to Madrid and Lisbon, ostensibly for the purpose of acquiring more Lufthansa runways, to re-establish resistance contacts with the British and try to activate the acquaintance between Prince Louis Ferdinand and President Roosevelt, who had once put the Prince up at Blair House. During this year he was turned in to the Gestapo by an aging and jealous prewar mistress, Frau Ameliess Pabst, and was rescued by his Abwehr connections. Also in 1942 Hans returned from the Russian front badly wounded and was taken to the famous surgeon Dr. Sauerbruch, who numbered among his assistants at the Charité Hospital the fateful Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. Otto soon learned to know the comrade of his future eastward flight by his pet name, Wowo.

John's peace feelers were received with considerable suspicion by the Allies, especially since he was unwilling at this time to name any conspirators. On 20 February 1943 the British intelligence service issued from London a statement to the effect that the Abwehr or the Gestapo was possibly inspiring his activities as a deception. He persisted, however, using as intermediary Juan Terraza, one of the principal diplomatic secretaries in the Spanish Foreign Office and a close friend of Louis Ferdinand. His attentions were directed

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toward Graham of the British Embassy in Lisbon and Willard L. Beaulac of the American Embassy in Madrid. Beaulac, on instructions from Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, saw John at his home but made no commitments. He, too, was dubious of his sincerity.

John's sincerity as a representative of the military element of the resistance, a role he was soon to assume, is in fact questionable. He was a dissenter among dissenters, thoroughly disliking the generals and never believing they would act against Hitler. He considered the military component of the 20 July group very weak and continually warned against it.

As 1943 wore along, his approaches became more definite. In December he told his British contact in Madrid that he represented an internal opposition group consisting of industrialists, trade union leaders, churchmen, and generals, all strongly anti-Nazi and anti-USSR. He ticked off names and disclosed details of another plot to murder Hitler.[4] In February 1944 he again came to Madrid ostensibly on Abwehr business. This time he said he was remaining in Spain as a representative of the anti-Nazi generals. As cover he assumed the directorship of the sister Lufthansa company there.

He later told the British that he performed no Abwehr missions on his trips to Spain. In early June 1944, however, the British ascertained that he had transmitted information concerning Allied military intentions to Berlin. The nature of this information is not known; it was probably innocuous. In any case the British and American embassies in Madrid, for their part, got valuable data from him—on the results of Allied bombings of Berlin, the German V-bomb and its launching bases, and the experimental station at Peenemuende.

The current of events leading to the ill-fated Generals' Coup was now quickening. Shortly after the Allied invasion of Normandy in June, John consulted in Madrid with Col. Georg Hansen, who as Canaris' successor at the head of the Abwehr was prospectively a chief negotiator with the Allies, specifi-

[4] At about this time the report that John was a British agent being handled by Major F. Landsdale and Cmdr. A. Fuller of the British Embassy in Lisbon was conveyed from the Portuguese General Staff to a German Lt. Col. von Auenrode (alias Karschof), who in turn informed Admiral Canaris. Canaris, of course, took no action.

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cally General Eisenhower at SHAEF, once the revolt had succeeded. In early July he made arrangements that any message from the conspirators would be passed immediately from the American Embassy in Madrid to General Eisenhower. At the same time he learned, to the dismay of the conspirators, that the Western Allies would not consider negotiating a separate peace, and that the British and Americans would probably make no effort to get to Berlin ahead of the Russians.[5]

There is conflicting evidence about his activities at the time of the attempted coup itself. According to his own story, he was called to Berlin to confirm in person his bad news of the unresponsiveness of the Western Allies, and arrived at Tempelhof Airdrome on 19 July. He was at OKW Headquarters in the Bendlerstrasse on the afternoon of 20 July when Col. Klaus von Stauffenberg arrived from East Prussia to report that the bomb had gone off and Hitler could be assumed dead. He worked with the conspirators there until 9:30 that evening, when it became evident that this attempt on Hitler's life had also failed, pro-Nazi officers were regaining control, and conspirators were being summarily executed in the courtyard. The next morning, according to his account, Johannes Popitz' daughter told him of her father's arrest, and he went into hiding. He escaped to Madrid on 24 July by signing on as a mechanic on a Lufthansa manifest.[6]

John's story, however, is contradicted by the lists of applicants for Spanish visas and travel manifests from Aerodrome del Prat del Llobregat. They show him arriving in Barcelona from Madrid via Lufthansa on 18 July and not departing for Berlin until 22 July. Allied intelligence regarded the variant embellishments of his account as probable fabrications and was inclined to suspect that Otto credited himself with activi-

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[5] Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 282. The ultimate source is John himself.

[6] That John was one of the pathetically few rebels to escape has been cited to support a theory that he was a Gestapo agent infiltrated into the conspiracy. We have noted that he was out of sympathy with the generals, and he seems not to have been intimately associated with any resistance circle except Louis Ferdinand's; but the Gestapo theory is untenable. He would hardly have betrayed his beloved brother Hans. Moreover, two SS aids of Walter Schellenberg later testified that the Gestapo had partially penetrated the 20 July group, but not through Otto John.

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ties rightly belonging to Hans. One MI-6 interrogator remarked that John seemed to change the story to keep from boring himself.

25X1 At any rate he turned up in late July or early August in Madrid, where he lived in a hotel some three weeks. [redacted] On 25 August they smuggled him to Lisbon and hid him at a safehouse, the Boa Vista, which was also used by Spanish Communists. On 23 October the Portuguese police raided this house and arrested John, the housekeeper Romero, and seven of the Spanish Communists.[7]

John was jailed for several days at Caxias. Then the Portuguese General Staff overruled the police and turned him over to the British. He was flown to the UK on 3 November, accompanied by Cmdr. Fuller, his contact at the British Embassy in Lisbon.

In the British Victor's Service

On John's arrival in the UK there was a wartime snafu as to his identity, and he was interned as a high-ranking Nazi. According to his own story, Churchill at this time called him in for a consultation that lasted half the night. He was released from internment and transferred to the Political Intelligence Department of the Political Warfare Executive on 11 December. He was turned over to Sefton Delmer, a top reporter for the London *Daily Express* and later for the *Times,* who was wartime director of the Morale Branch of PID. According to Delmer, John lived with him for 10 months. Delmer is another person who will reappear before this drama is acted out.

In 1945 and 1946 John worked for the British in various capacities—with PID on intelligence matters, on the POW reorientation program at Wilton Park, and on research for [redacted] 25X1

[7] There are diverse accounts of this episode. One intelligence version has it that John was arrested because of his friendship for Professor Egaz Morriz, frequently referred to in Portugal as the unofficial Soviet ambassador. *Der Spiegel,* ten years later, said that he was arrested as a homosexual. Another section of the German press insisted that he was arrested at a fiesta when he got into a brawl over a woman.

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A tally of John's fellow-Germans [redacted] —Dr. Honigmann, Eberhard Koebel, Karl von Schnitzler, and Putlitz, the agent-baron discharged by the OWI—is intriguing: all of them, like John, were later to decamp to the East Zone of Germany.

After the surrender in May 1945, John did not return to Germany with the bulk of the political exiles. He was working for the British War and Foreign Offices, interrogating German generals in the Kensington cage, and helping prepare legal documents for the approaching Nuremberg trials. At Nuremberg he worked as an adviser to the UK prosecution staff, a fact omitted in his own curriculum vitae.

Up to this time he could lay valid claim to being a German patriot. The cause which met catastrophe on 20 July had been a worthy one, that of revolt against the Nazis, not treason to the German nation. Its watchword was, "Against Hitler, for Germany." But when he returned for the Nuremberg trials, it was in effect as a German in British battle dress. He revisited with the wrath of a prosecutor the country which he had fled as a political persecutee. He kept aloof from other Germans working at the trials, attempted to conceal his identity and purpose, and spent his free time with his British colleagues, trying unsuccessfully to pose as an Englishman doing historical research in the documents of the Tribunal. The spirit of the trials themselves, in which righteous indignation at the Nazi horrors was not untainted by thirst for political vengeance, may have contributed further to the warping of John's character.

He was already showing psychoneurotic tendencies. In 1946 in London he attended a private War Office showing of a film on the Belzen concentration camp. Shortly after the movie, he told an intelligence officer five years later, the lower part of his face began to discharge a pus-like fluid and he suffered a species of nervous breakdown. His explanation was that the movie brought home to him the terrible failure of the 20 July revolt and all it stood for; he had been condemned to virtual inactivity since his flight to the UK and the accumulated frustration was simply too much for him. John clearly identified himself closely with the failure of the anti-Hitler

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resistance and had a strong guilt complex deriving probably from his brother's painful death. This reinforced his obsession with the July affair and his inability to compromise with anything remotely identifiable with Nazis, right-wing politicians, or German military traditions. His excessive drinking and other manifestations of emotional instability would be symptomatic of such a state of mind.

He may have had woman-trouble, too. In 1949, after practicing law in London for a year, he married Frau Lucy-Marleen Mankiewitz, the *mother* of the girl he had been expected to wed. His new wife, a German Jewess whose father was an old friend and adviser of Dr. Theodor Heuss, taught Wagnerian singing at Hampstead. She has been described as making up in charm and intellect for the greater beauty of her jilted daughter Gisela, with whom John had worked in a wartime British operation.

John's mistress, Frau Elsa Mueller Rudolph in Wiesbaden, the widow of a German pilot killed in action in 1943, was another who stood to be offended by this marriage. John wrote in explanation that he was marrying an older woman because of his need for balance, and moreover his bride had important political connections in the new Germany through her family. He hoped that he and Elsa could remain friends. They did. It was Elsa who, as nearly as can be ascertained, enlarged Otto's circle of acquaintances to include Ian Eland, [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] who was later helpful in exposing and eliminating one of John's rivals for the presidency of the Verfassungsschutzamt.

In the fall of 1949, no longer trying to conceal his services to the UK, John became openly the chief German assistant to the British prosecution at the trial of General von Manstein in Hamburg. This time he apparently associated with the German lawyers defending Von Manstein. But he irked the defense, it is said, by deliberately twisting facts and evidence to the advantage of the prosecutors, many of whom relied heavily on him because of their unfamiliarity with the German language and with the organization and practices of the Nazi Reich. Several friends implored him at this time to get out of the business of delivering his countrymen to the Allied hangman, and their warning that he was alienating

himself from his fatherland must have increased his emotional stresses.

John was not doing awfully well financially in the UK. He was employed by the London solicitors James Brodie & Company on reparation and restitution cases, but he could not base a career on claims arising out of a past era. He suffered from the lack of the British citizenship that had been extended to Putlitz and certain other Germans. (At times he claimed that he had declined a proferred citizenship.) Germany, on the other hand, was getting back on her feet economically.

During 1949 and 1950 he made several trips to Germany to see friends in the Bonn government about a job. Jakob Kaiser, whom he had known as a leader of the Catholic trade union resistance, offered him one in his Ministry of All-German Affairs, but John declined on the ground that he deserved a higher rank than Ministerialrat. Foreign Affairs had no place for him because, he suspected, of his "anti-German" activities in the UK and his role at the trials. He also tried unsuccessfully for an appointment on the German delegation to the International Ruhr Authority.

The Protector of the Constitution

In 1950 West Germany was passing through the interim stage on the road from occupation to sovereignty, and an important question was that of preserving ideological rectitude in the new state. The French did not want it to have any political police. The British favored an adaptation of Scotland Yard. The United States came up with an emasculated FBI plan. The Germans wanted to return to the pre-Hitler scheme, incorporating the political police as Branch 1A into the national police. The eventual compromise was the watery conception of an Office for the Protection of the Constitution, a police force with no power to arrest. It was supposed to be a silent security service keeping tabs on the lunatic fringes to the right and left.

How was it that Otto John, a man who already showed signs of needing watching himself, almost an expatriate, whom Chancellor Adenauer is said to have disliked from first sight, was named head of the sensitive Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz? Or, as the Germans put it in their rough peasant

proverb, "Who put the goat in charge of the garden?" As assets he had an influential friend in Jakob Kaiser, his connections by marriage with President Heuss, and most importantly the gratitude of the British for his work for them during the war and in the Nazi trials.

And it was not an easy job to fill, with its international political implications. The German proposal to appoint a nonpolitical civil servant was vetoed by the Allied High Commissioners. The United States suggested an excellent man in Fabian von Schlabrendorff, but he refused on grounds of ill health. The French nominated Colonel Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, information chief in the embryo defense ministry, but John disposed of this rival by having Ian Eland, his mistress' agent friend, put the finger on Heinz as the source of his espionage reports [redacted] Finally, after 15 months, 12 rejected nominees, and 10 wrangling sessions of the High Commission, the British quietly sponsored Otto John, for bad luck the thirteenth man.

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The German lawyers who had defended Von Manstein and the Nuremberg accused were shocked. They complained to Minister of the Interior Heinemann that John was unscrupulous and altogether a bad choice. Heinemann replied that the British trusted John, and anyway the job was unimportant: Germany was in no position to keep secrets from the occupation powers.

U.S. approval was another Gordian knot. On 22 November 1950 High Commissioner McCloy cabled the Department of State from Frankfurt that the Federal Republic had requested HICOG to approve John's candidacy with all possible urgency, and that only the results of the Department's name check were needed to clear the way. A week later, at 1800 Washingon time, 29 November, a cable over Dean Acheson's signature informed Frankfurt that conflicting information regarding Otto John "necessitates thorough investigation by Army G–2 of other sources. Results follow soonest." But on 1 December, at 0909, McCloy wired back:

> On basis of excellent data available here and in absence of any derogatory information and in view of urgency of making a decision and after approval by British and French, we approved appointment of Otto John on 29 November, prior to receipt of your telegram of 29 November.

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The newly installed BfV president was again the center of discussions by the Allied Directorate when, on 7 March 1951, they took up the appointment of Vera Schwart, formerly a secretary of Admiral Canaris, as John's secretary. The United States and the UK raised no objections. But the French did, on the grounds that Vera, arrested by the Soviets in 1946, had turned informer for them the following year. The glandular dislike of French intelligence for John had been reflected in the comment of a Sureté chief on his appointment: he had exclaimed, in chorus with a Turkish colleague, "C'est impossible!"

Just how impossible a choice John was became increasingly apparent. Aside from his instability and his emotional political outlook, he was a poor administrator and lacked balanced judgment. U.S. intelligence saw him muddling through without the energy, imagination, or administrative ability to put the BfV on its feet. He had no patience with the painstaking detail necessary to effective intelligence operations. He was intrigued by special missions and fanciful projects which usually wound up putting the Office and the government in embarrassing, not to say ridiculous, positions.

One of the score of projects John laid on was Operation Maerchenwald. The good fairy of this Fabulous Wood was a buxom widow named Frau Baumann from Ansbach in Bavaria, confessed guardian of a vast Nazi treasure trove from which she was supposed to make monthly withdrawals to support indigent Nazi leaders in Switzerland and South America. The cache was somewhere in the Bavarian Alps, sometimes at the bottom of a lake, a very deep lake, the Frau said. John, taking her at her word, dispatched six green-jacketed BfV men to escort her to the treasure. She took them up into the Tyrolean mountains, where, according to an official report, she found the right blazed tree and the secret path of white pebbles, but was unable to find the stone slab covering the lever that opened the way to the cache.

While John was waiting in his Cologne command post for his men to report the find, U.S. operatives came to see him and showed him documents proving that his good fairy was a swindler, blackmail artist, public nuisance, and congenital liar, once inmate of an insane asylum. Nevertheless John

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summoned Frau Baumann to Cologne to reveal more details. Somewhat drunk, he had a two-hour seance with her.

By mid-1952 Bonn was rocking with gossip about his antics. Report after report reaching Adenauer's desk indicated that in his hatred of the Nazis John was not alert to the Communist danger, that he maintained relations with Communist sympathizers, that he was given to fits of melancholy brooding, and that he was increasingly taking to drink. But the Chancellor had no intention of lowering the boom on him until Germany achieved her sovereignty.

The BfV's serious operations were apparently in the hands of its de facto director, former General Staff officer Albert Radke. He was a close associate of General Reinhard Gehlen, who had headed the wartime General Staff's section for evaluating Eastern intelligence and in postwar Germany bossed a high-powered unofficial offensive espionage group. Gehlen distrusted John because of his record of defection to the British.

John's four years in office were extremely unpleasant. He was resented by senior police officials and other German civil servants as an outsider, as a stooge of his British sponsors, and as one who had deserted Germany in her hour of need. Rumors were growing that his days in the BfV were numbered, that his office would be replaced by Gehlen's organization. He may have brooded most over this prospect of being supplanted by Gehlen, whom he regarded as one of the military group responsible for the failure of the 1944 coup and so for Hans' death by torture.

In May and June of 1954 he enjoyed the pleasant interlude of a trip to the United States. He was brought to Washington and shown the courtesies normally accorded the head of a foreign intelligence service. CIA officials dined him, and on 7 June he was briefed on general intelligence matters.

Details in a Defection

John returned to the Federal Republic in fine fettle. Dr. Wohlgemuth, however, who visited him in Cologne on 9 July, insisted he appeared run down and prescribed pills. John, rather than argue about it, took them without visible effect, though later he tried to use this incident in his defense. On 8 and again on 12 July he was visited by Michael Winch, a

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discredited British-Soviet double agent. The subject of their conversations is not known. Frau John, who happened to be in Cologne, objected to Winch, probably because he was cadging meals and money.

John's twelve-year-old relationship with Wohlgemuth had been a matter of concern for some time. [redacted] 25X1 is reported to have warned him twice about friend Wowo, first in March 1953 and again in July 1954. After the first warning John is said to have detailed a BfV man, Von Berge, to watch him for a while, and on the second occasion to have given an "embarrassed" and conflicting account of his contacts with him. Before John's visit to the United States, a Berlin shopkeeper, Frau Anneliese Schroeder, showed police notes of a conversation with one Helmut Salewski, a close friend of Wohlgemuth's. Salewski told her Wowo kept a tape recorder hidden in his room and persuaded John to talk about secret matters when he visited him for evenings of women and drinking.

On 15 July the Johns flew to West Berlin for the services commemorating the decennial of the 20 July revolt. Beginning with a reception given by Oberburgmeister Reuter on the evening of 18 July, families and friends of the participants in the plot against the Nazi regime met for the purpose of unveiling a monument to the victims in the courtyard of the former OKW in the Bendlerstrasse. John and his wife took advantage of this opportunity to dine twice with his old school friend of Wiesbaden days, Wolfgang Hoffer, now a captain in the American CIC. Hoffer said that the Americans regarded John as a British agent, and that he himself couldn't stand the CIC any longer and wanted John to help him locate a job in Germany. He wanted nothing more to do with intelligence services.

An intelligence officer who spent considerable time with John during this convocation said he "lamented several times about the bad things people were saying about him and about attacks against him coming from Minister Robert Lehr and Herr Sauer. Shortly before he left Bonn to attend the Berlin festivities, he was called into [State Secretary] Ritter von Lex's office and was told they had just received a complaint from the Federal Chancellery accusing him of secretly join-

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ing the SPD. John said he was sick and tired of these rumors, and if a good opportunity presents itself he would seriously consider rejoining the Deutsche Lufthansa when it starts functioning again." [8]

In this mood he came upon a newspaper account of how Minister of the Interior Schroeder, his superior, planned drastic changes in the BfV as soon as West Germany obtained its sovereignty. He was reported to appear visibly shaken. At the commemorative exercises he made an exhibition of himself, sobbing loudly and denouncing two other mourners as Gestapo agents. Although the memories evoked of Hans' death ten years earlier were undoubtedly depressing, he had always been jovial and friendly at the memorial services of previous years.

Immediately after the ceremonies John declined to dine with his old friend Prince Louis Ferdinand, saying that he was meeting with some East Zone people.

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When Louis Ferdinand then suggested that Otto drop by his hotel afterwards for a nightcap, he gave a curt "No." This was about 1600 on 20 July.

John kept an engagement, however, with an elderly German couple, in-laws of an American acquaintance, at his hotel. In this interval between the memorial exercises in the Bendlerstrasse and his appointment with Wohlgemuth, he also saw Bonde-Henriksen, correspondent for the Danish paper *Berlingske Tidende,* the man who after eighteen months was to help him return from East Germany, and apparently expected to have a drink with him later in the evening.

A perhaps equivocal indication of his intention to come back that night was the fact that when he changed clothes he left papers and notes from his pockets in his hotel room. But he also had reservations for a return flight from Berlin, and his desk calendar in Cologne showed a future schedule of normal activities. Driving from his hotel, he stopped in at the Maison de France, a restaurant near Wohlgemuth's downtown office, in order, according to Erich Ollenhauer, to pick up there an answer to a proposal he had made Mendes-France that the

[8] Lufthansa would not have taken him.

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Federal Republic's remilitarization plans be exposed to debate at the forthcoming Geneva Conference. The answer was not there.

For John's meeting and movements with Wohlgemuth the evidence consisted until recently mainly of his own account given after redefection, which begins by omitting these known preliminary activities, emphasizes a suspicious cup of coffee served him at the Wohlgemuth apartment, and ends in a theatrical invented scene wherein he awakens from a drugged sleep in an abandoned house and is threatened by Communists speaking with a Russian accent. But there were three important facts from other sources. Item one, Wohlgemuth telephoned the Charité Hospital in East Berlin that evening and said, "I shall come now with my good friend." Item two, he apparently intended, like John, to come back: he left in West Berlin his 10 suits of clothes, four apartments, five mistresses, and third wife. Later we shall look at other evidence of Wohlgemuth's intent made public in 1958 by the release of testimony given at John's treason trial. Item three, the customs officer on duty at the Sandkrug Bridge that night, Ernst Richard Hanke, who halted Wohlgemuth's sedan at the border, peered inside and saw that both occupants were awake and alert. When Hanke pointed out that the vehicle was about to enter the Soviet sector, a man of John's description replied, "Aber dort wollen wir doch hin—Well, that's where we want to go."

The Bonn Government insisted that John must have been abducted. They offered a reward of DM500,000 for conclusive information. A special Bundestag committee was established to investigate the affair. A variant on the abduction explanation was given by a U.S. intelligence cable:

> John was a damned fool caught in a well-baited trap. . . . He very likely overestimated his own position to the extent of believing that the Soviets would not dare harm him. He took and miscalculated a risk in pursuit of bait set by persons who evaluated correctly his psychology and his desire to score a major personal coup following heavy attacks on his office in recent Bundestag debates.

The suicide on 23 July of Otto's friend Hoffer, who had believed that the German secret police supposedly guarding John had actually been holding him under arrest, made the

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mystery a double one. John claimed, in a statement broadcast from East Berlin, that his friend had been driven to desperation by the CIC's insistence that he spy on him. Part of the German press said that Hoffer killed himself rather than face an inevitable investigation. The U.S. Army officially denied that he had been detailed to check up on John or on Wohlgemuth. U.S. intelligence had him feeling that the defection of his life-long friend shattered his whole intelligence career.

The British, publicly at any rate, stood by John. They denied on 5 August that any British official had been the source of an Associated Press story to the effect that they had dropped John ten months earlier; they considered such a report to be "skillful sabotage." John continued to have a surprisingly good British press,

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[redacted]

At the other extreme were those who believed, on the grounds of John's vulnerability and associations, that he might have long since become a Soviet agent; and these included [redacted] At least there were reports pointing to possible Communist pressures and preparation. Baron Wolfgang von und zu Putlitz, who first boasted and then denied having engineered the defection of Burgess and MacLean and who urged John on 16 March 1953 that he at least confer with a Soviet officer about saving Germany from being caught in an East-West conflict, visited Bonn in the spring of 1954 and again in July, and on at least one of these occasions he met with John. Informed circles in East Berlin were reported in August to consider John's defection and that of the Bundestag deputy Karl Franz Schmidt-Wittmack to have been masterminded by Soviet General Ivan A. Serov and run from KGB headquarters in Karlshorst.[9] And a refugee who had worked

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[9] Peter Deriabin says that at the time of his own defection in September 1953 Soviet State Security was building up a file on John's dealings with the Nazis, and he suggests John was blackmailed into defecting by the Soviet threat to expose his pro-Nazi activities! (*The Secret World*, p. 197.)

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for the East German Security Service claimed later to have heard Colonel Beater of the Service remark that two of his agents, Axel and Peter (the Rittwagens) were preparing in West Berlin for the defection or, if necessary, the abduction of Otto John, and that Beater had met at least once with Wohlgemuth and with Wolfgang Hoffer of the CIC.

Except to doggedly suspicious minds the baited-trap, drug-abduction, long-time-agent, and fleeing-wrongdoer theories were disproved and the main mysteries of the case cleared up by John's public appearance and a private conversation on 11 August. At a conference attended by 400 Western and Communist reporters in the East Berlin press building on Friedrichstrasse, he said that the West German government had become a mere instrument of American European policy, which was using Chancellor Adenauer to renazify and remilitarize Germany as a spearhead against the USSR, that there were secret clauses in the EDC treaty in this connection, that Adenauer and the militarists regarded the EDC as an interim device for restoring German military hegemony in Europe, that the Gehlen organization had stepped up its activities in France to this end, and that the Americans, in their hysterical fear of Communism, were preparing a new Hitler Crusade against the East that would leave Germany a mass of atomic ashes.

These standard theses of the Communist propaganda line were probably consonant with John's own anti-Nazi and anti-military obsession, reinforced in recent months by his growing feeling of being not appreciated in West Germany and not wanted in the government, even deliberately persecuted under the influence of the neo-Nazis. And if he felt guilt over his earlier desertion to the British, he could now choose the anti-Nazi East and still remain on German soil rather than "flee for a second time," as he later told the Danish correspondent Henrik Bonde-Henriksen.

After the press conference John had a 45-minute talk over glasses of beer with Gaston Coblentz of the New York *Herald Tribune* and two London paper correspondents, Karl Robson of the *News Chronicle* and his one-time boss and benefactor Sefton Delmer of the *Daily Express*. They were joined at the table in a private dining room of the press building by four

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Communist members of the Council for German Unity, but these made no attempt to control the conversation. They did not need to, the three Western correspondents agreed: John was saying of his own volition what they would have sought to have him say. The three gave him many opportunities to indicate by some sign that he was being held against his will, but although the talk around the table was going in several directions and it would have been easy, he did not do so.

John reiterated that he had crossed over voluntarily because of his long-smoldering unhappiness about renazification in West Germany. In reply to a question about Dr. Wohlgemuth's role, he said it was relatively unimportant—"he only established my contact with the Communist regime." John substantiated the theory that he had not intended to remain in the Soviet Zone when he drove across the Sandkrug Bridge with Wowo. Asked whether he had decided in advance to stay, he replied: "No. My decision was made only after my talks with the Communist authorities. I came over to confirm that I would be able to stay on my terms. I was able to do so. I would have been free to return if I had wanted to."

John's motives do at this point seem understandable, and the main course of events clear. But as late as November 1958, perhaps because the picture was again confused by redefection, a senior U.S. intelligence officer in Germany was of the opinion that, "barring an unforeseeable stroke of good fortune, we doubt that we shall ever know the true circumstances which prompted Otto John's appearance in East Berlin."

The Way Back

Shortly after his arrival in East Germany, John was reported to have made contact with Dr. Erich Correns, head of the National Front, and to have prepared for the Ministry of Interior a list of some 50 West German government officials possibly susceptible to defection inducements. On 14 August the West Berlin *Telegraf* reported his suggesting that former Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus, who surrendered the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, head a committee to "unveil the aggressive machinations of the National Socialist circles in West Germany."

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A few weeks later, the East German government announced plans for a Ministry for German Unity to be headed by John. Its proposed purpose was to establish contact with persons in West German public life who were opposed to the Bonn government and thus encourage their opposition or provide them with an incentive to defect. The ministry never materialized, although John wrote to a number of prominent West German politicians urging them to take a stand against the U.S.-Adenauer policies.

On 19 September 1954 John was reported to be working on the All-German Committee of the East Zone government and also on the German Committee sponsored by the GDR Press and Information Office. It was learned later that he spent several weeks that fall in the USSR. Reports received in December 1954 indicated that he was planning to establish permanent residence in Leipzig, that he was working with the new East German Lufthansa, and that he was making preparations for a propaganda offensive to re-establish a constitutional monarchy in Germany and would soon make overtures to Prince Louis Ferdinand.

In March 1955 it was learned that he had been appointed permanent adviser to the National Council of the National Front and was touring the Soviet zone in official capacity, attending conferences of regional committees and issuing special directives for conducting anti-West propaganda. Late in October he was reported to be editor of a new publication, the *Berliner Politische Korrespondenz,* directed against the policies of the Bonn government and intended mainly for dissemination in West Berlin and the Federal Republic. He was also reported to be writing memoires.

But there had already been indications that John, disappointed with East Germany and with having been given only the position of "itinerant preacher for reunification," as he wrote his wife, was toying with the idea of returning to the West. This was the implication of a statement he made to Bonde-Henriksen in June 1955 that he was free to leave at any moment but hesitated because of fear of being arrested in West Germany. In a three-hour interview with the Danish correspondent, John said he would not have stayed on in East Germany if he thought the USSR desired war. Henrik-

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sen remarked, "It is a question of whether you would have been permitted to say 'Goodbye and thanks,' " and John replied, "I guess I would have known ways and means . . ." He concluded the interview by saying: "I am a human being with the shortcomings and virtues of a human being. I can be accused of many things, but I have not failed the ideals of my youth. You may call me naive. Nevertheless, I am realistic and developments will prove me right."

In less than six months, however, perhaps particularly moved by a message from Prince Louis to the effect that if John really believed the things he was saying he could no longer be his friend, John arranged with Bonde-Henriksen to be picked up on Unter den Linden in front of the University at 1650 hours on 12 December 1955. At about 1635 he entered the University from Dorotheenstrasse, telling his two guards to wait at the gate since he had an appointment there. The guards let him go in alone. He walked through the buildings to where Henriksen was parked, waiting. Partially disguised in a muffler and dark glasses, he drove with Henriksen in the car bearing the Danish coat of arms through the Brandenburg Gate to the Victory Column and then to Tempelhof Airdrome.

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Bonde-Henriksen and Wiechmann from the regional BfV office flew with him to Wahn. From there he was driven to Bonn.

Post Mortem

His fears of being arrested after his redefection were soon confirmed. He was charged on 18 January 1956 with treasonable conspiracy and high treason for his East Zone activities. His defense was that he thought it less damaging to West Germany, once he found himself in Communist hands through the drug-abduction routine, if he pretended to cooperate; if he refused, he would be brainwashed and forced to reveal state secrets of importance. He contended that he had had no chance to speak freely with Sefton Delmer and the other Western correspondents at his 11 August press conference or to convey any hint to anyone during the entire eighteen months that he was acting under compulsion.

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The court was unimpressed. After a painstaking review of all the circumstances he was found guilty on two counts of treasonable conspiracy for his services to Eastern propaganda organizations. He was acquitted of betraying state secrets, but judged guilty of treasonable falsifications that would have been secret if true—his allegation of secret clauses in the EDC treaty and of activities of the Gehlen organization aimed at European hegemony. Sentenced to four years' imprisonment, he was released in July 1958 under an amnesty granted by President Heuss.

Wohlgemuth was brought to trial on treason charges but acquitted on 14 December 1958 by the West German Supreme Court. The court proceedings in the Wohlgemuth case have not yet been released, but the publication in 1958 of the official *Urteil* from the trial of Otto John [10] confirms the general outline of both men's motivations and actions drawn above and fills in some details.

The testimony of witnesses established that by the spring of 1954 John had become so apprehensive about attacks on him and his Office that he secured the promise of a legal position with an industrial firm against eventualities. It was clear to the court also that he had been genuinely, if unjustifiably, troubled by the idea that National Socialism might regain political power in Bonn. His political thinking, if somewhat vague, was certainly oriented toward the West and away from totalitarian forms of government. He distrusted military men, opposed remilitarization, and was shocked by the very thought of another war.

Witnesses pictured him as almost pathologically disturbed during his July visit to Berlin. He was convinced that the newspaper story of changes planned by the Interior Minister was aimed at him. At a lunch on 17 July, when someone remarked that only a war could resolve the current tension, he "shot up out of his chair." At the BfV Berlin office that afternoon he went to pieces, complaining with half-drunken vehemence about the lack of confidence in him. On 19 July

[10] *Hochverrat und Staatsgefaerdung*, Band II (Karlsruhe: C. F. Mueller, 1958), pp. 77–150. The *Urteil* includes an exhaustive and impartial summary of the evidence and arguments of both prosecution and defense.

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at lunch he bemoaned the "growing influence of the Nazis" and went into a long reminiscence of the Third Reich and his own misunderstood role at Nuremberg. The memorial service on 20 July had an extraordinarily shattering effect on him.

With respect to any premeditation of his 20 July defection it was testified that he had booked a return flight to Cologne for 22 July, that he had refused his secretary's request for use of the official car on 21 July on the grounds that he would need it himself, that he told his chauffeur after dinner on 20 July that he was through with the car for the day but would call for it in the morning, and that as he left the hotel for the last time, although a clerk told him his wife was in the lobby, he did not say goodbye to her. His frequent letters to her from the East Zone referred again and again to his "sudden" decision and entreated her for understanding.

There was evidence also that the East German security service was unprepared for John's appearance in the East Zone and uncertain about his motives: a West German woman journalist whom it had imprisoned two years earlier on espionage charges and whom it supposed knew a good deal about John was brought before one of its officers in Halle just after 20 July and questioned as to whether she thought John's defection bona fide. Another West German journalist was told by John himself, in complete privacy on 13 May 1955, that the "number two Russian" in Karlshorst to whom he had offered his collaboration on 20 July was surprised, but made a kind of gentleman's agreement not to demand any secrets from him and to let him move about freely.

The testimony did not touch on the Hoffer mystery except to show that John had been inflating a jest of Hoffer's when he claimed the CIC had made him spy on him. From the bits of evidence available here it appears likely that Hoffer was disillusioned with intelligence intrigues, had made some indiscreet contacts in East Germany, and was afraid that his friend's defection would bring on an interrogation and exposure. John's attempt to blame his suicide on the CIC probably reflected a feeling of guilt for it on his own part.

Wohlgemuth, who did not make himself available as a witness, was pictured in the testimony as politically far to the

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left, announcing to all and sundry his conviction that Communism would come to power in western Europe within a few years. Nevertheless he had apparently not engaged in any legally actionable activities. With respect to his intentions in driving John across the Sandkrug Bridge, it was testified that when the two men left the office-apartment after the end of the Doctor's office hours that night, he was still wearing his white trousers and carrying only a trench coat, and that in the wee hours of 21 July he came back, alone, very much upset, and dashed to and fro through the house hastily packing a trunk.

He told the night nurse that John, whom he had introduced to some people in the East Zone, had unexpectedly decided to remain there, and that he himself might be suspected of wrongdoing and was therefore going back to stay at the Charité until things quieted down. He left a note for the day nurse to the same effect, and told her to take care of the office and apartment. Between 4 and 5 a.m. he telephoned his attorney, gave him the same excited account, and asked him to take full powers over his property. Then he went to his mistress' house in Lietzenburger street, where he maintained a one-room apartment, and called her down to the street. Telling her what had happened, he suggested that his apartment might be searched and asked her to remove his camera, photographs, films, and books. At about five o'clock he stopped at the Uhland garage for gasoline, where the attendant noticed that he seemed to be in "even a bigger hurry than usual."

None of these people informed the police or Frau John, however, who first got from intelligence sources the news of John's probable defection, confirmed on 23 July by his own announcement over the East German radio:

> . . . I have taken a resolute step and made contact with the East Germans. I have been deprived of any basis for political activity in the Federal Republic. After I had been continually heckled in my office by the Nazis again rampant everywhere in political and even in public life, the Federal Minister of the Interior has now made any further work in my official position impossible for me by declaring to the press that with the coming of sovereignty he would have a free hand and be able "to entrust the protection of the constitution to persons who are truly above suspicion." . . . German policy has run into a

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> blind alley . . . yet there is still a possibility of reunification. . . . I shall soon present my ideas and plans for German reunification to the German public.

Some students of the case are still convinced, in spite of the apparent adequacy of John's personal motivation, that he must nevertheless have defected under Soviet or more likely British control. To them the case can but remain a mystery; for although acquaintances like Winch, Putlitz, and Wohlgemuth may well have encouraged John's own obsessions, no evidence has come to light on how a supposed definitive control was exercised, and it is difficult to arrive even at a persuasive theoretical reconstruction of British or Soviet purposes consistent with the facts.

It seemed evident to the court, as it does to a reader of the intelligence files, that John's decision to approach the Communist authorities in the East Zone, made in a state of heightened neurotic tension and perhaps alcoholic befuddlement, derived from his frustration in what he considered his mission to stem the renazification of Germany and was precipitated by the imminent likelihood of his losing what position and influence he still had in the Federal Republic. When his initial Soviet contacts in Karlshorst led him, it seems probable, to believe he would be free of duress in the East and might be able to accomplish there what he could not in the West, he forthwith made his marriage of convenience with the Communists, in which any real position and influence yet escaped him and from which he eventually opted to return to his Western wife and friends.

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SECRET

An unsolved problem analyzed in depth and some approaches recommended to solution.

A FRESH LOOK AT COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Clyde R. Heffter

In the immediate post-war period, the word "requirement" was seldom heard in intelligence circles, and what we now know as collection requirements were managed in a very off-hand way. Today this subject is well to the fore, its importance acknowledged by everyone. Looking back, it is possible to see certain steps by which this reversal of things came about.

First there was a time when many people, both collectors and consumers, saw no need for requirements at all—when information was believed to be there for the plucking, and the field intelligence officer was considered to need no help in deciding what to pluck. This period overlapped and merged quickly into a second one in which requirements were recognized as desirable but were not thought to present any special problem. Perhaps the man in the field did, after all, need some guidance; if so, the expert in Washington had only to jot down a list of questions and all would be well.

A third phase began when it was recognized that requirements were an integral and necessary part of the intelligence process and that they needed to be fostered and systematized. Committees were set up, priorities authorized, channels established, forms devised, control numbers assigned. Thus by the early 1950's the formal requirements machinery of today was mostly in place.

The fourth and most interesting phase, which is still with us, might be called the phase of specialized methodologies. The harsh difficulties of intelligence collection against the Sino-Soviet Bloc have driven home the realization that the way a requirement is conceived and drawn, the way it gets at its ultimate objective, the details it includes, the alternatives it provides, the discretion it permits, and a dozen other features may largely predetermine its chances of fulfilment.

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Specialists in many fields, intent on solving immediate, concrete problems, have created new types of requirements peculiarly adapted to their own aims and circumstances. One requirement may take its shape from an analytical technique,

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[redacted] Another may be cast in the mold of a collection method—photography, ELINT, exploitation of legal travel. Subjects, areas, sources, access, communications—all have put their mark on the writing of requirements.

If we turn from the past and speculate on the future, we can hardly doubt that it will be one of intensified effort. For it is more and more evident that the answers we get are intimately conditioned by the questions we ask, and that asking the right questions—the business of requirements—is no spare-time job. But what direction should this intensified effort take?

Undoubtedly the healthy specialization and experimentalism of the present should and will continue. But by itself this is not an adequate program. The problems of requirements are not all special problems. Some of them are central to the very nature of the requirements process. One cannot help feeling that too little of the best thinking of the community has gone into these central problems—into the development, in a word, of an adequate theory of requirements.

It would be untrue to imply that nobody has been concerning himself with the broad questions. Much expert thought has gone into the revisions of guidance papers for the community at large or for major segments of it. But there is often a conspicuous hiatus between these high-level documents and the requirements produced on the working level. Dealing with general matters has itself become a specialty. We lack a vigorous exchange of views between generalists and specialists, requirements officers and administrators, members of all agencies, analysts in all intelligence fields, practitioners of all collection methods, which might lead at least to a clarification of ideas and at best to a solution of some common problems.

It is the aim of this paper to incite, if possible, such an exchange of views. It offers as candidate for the title of Number One Requirements Problem the problem of *priorities.* More exactly, it is the problem of how to formulate needs and priorities in such a way as to facilitate the satisfaction of

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needs in a degree roughly proportionate to their priorities, through the most effective use of the collection means available.

This problem is one which deserves and will probably reward the most searching study that can be given it. The present paper cannot claim to be such a study. Among its limitations is the fact that the writer's personal experience is confined to the clandestine collection field. It seeks, however, to demonstrate that there *is* such a general problem; that it is amenable to general analysis; that it must be examined not merely as a problem in administration but as one in analytical method; and finally that it is one with which the individual intelligence officer can effectively concern himself. The few specific proposals in the following pages are incidental to these general aims.

We may begin with a provisional definition of a collection requirement as simply "a statement of information to be collected." Our next step is to examine the most important varieties of such statements.

Kinds of Requirement

In the management of collection requirements there are certain persistent tendencies that reflect the divergent interests of the participants. There is the tendency of the analyst to publish a list of all his needs in the hope that somebody will satisfy them. There is the tendency of the theorist and the administrator to want a closely knit system whereby all requirements can be fed into a single machine, integrated, ranged by priorities, and allocated as directives to all parts of the collection apparatus. And there is the tendency of the collector to demand specific, well-defined requests for information, keyed to his special capabilities.

These tendencies are capable of complementing each other usefully if brought into reasonable balance, but their coexistence has more often been marked with friction.

It will be useful at this point to take a look at the word "requirement" in ordinary English usage. For the divergent tendencies just mentioned have a remarkable parallel in certain divergent but thoroughly ingrained connotations of the

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word itself. It is highly likely that these connotations, jumbled together loosely in the backs of our minds, help to create our notions of what a requirement "really ought to be." Though not mutually exclusive, they are sufficiently different that as one or the other predominates, the character of the resultant concept varies appreciably.

The first connotation is that of *need.* A requirement is something needed, or a statement of that need. This meaning does not necessarily involve the idea of authority. The need is objective; it is determined by the facts of the case. Thus food, water, and oxygen are requirements of the human organism. And thus information on various subjects is a requirement of the analyst, the intelligence organization, and the Government itself. When we think of the intelligence requirements of the Government, we are thinking not merely of what has been authoritatively determined to be needed, but of what actually *is* needed. This way of regarding requirements, which is basic and which we all share to some extent, adds dignity to our conception of our work. To the analyst, who thinks in terms of what he needs in order to do his job, it is the dominant connotation, and in fact the only one he cares about until experience forces him to look farther.

The second connotation for most people is that of *compulsion* or command, stemming from authority. As children we are "required" to go to school. In college we must take certain "required" courses. In intelligence, many of us regard a requirement as essentially a directive from a higher echelon to a lower one. In this view, the key question is not whether the information is objectively needed but whether its procurement has been directed by competent authority. It is a view which commends itself to the administrator, who would, of course, contend that certification by competent authority provides the best assurance that a valid need exists. This connotation, like the first, exists in varying degrees for everyone. Where it dominates, it leads to an emphasis on machinery, systems, channels, committees.

Finally, there is the connotation of *request.* Though "request" is no longer an active meaning of "require," both come from the same root, along with "inquire," "question," and "query." In intelligence this meaning has again come into its

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own. Under this interpretation, one equal (the "customer") makes a request or puts a question to another (the collector), who fulfills or answers it as best he can. There is a sort of honor system on both sides—with a dash of mutual suspicion. The requester vouches for the validity of the requirement, though the collector is free to reject it. If he accepts it, the collector gives an implied assurance that he will do his best on it, and this the requester is free to doubt. In any event the relationship is a mutual one, and in its pure form is free from compulsion. The use of direct requests appeals particularly to the collector, who finds that it provides him with more viable, collectible requirements than any other method. It sometimes appeals also to the requester-analyst, who if he finds a receptive collector is able by this means to get more requirements accepted than would be possible otherwise. Again, it is sometimes disillusioning to both, if the collector comes to feel overburdened or the analyst to feel neglected.

These three connotations of need, compulsion, and request are embodied in three kinds of collection requirement, to which we shall arbitrarily give names—the inventory of needs, addressed to the community at large and to nobody in particular; the directive, addressed by a higher to a lower echelon; and the request, addressed by a customer to a collector.

The Requirement as Inventory of Needs

An example of the *inventory of needs* is the series of Periodic Requirements (recently relabeled *Reporting*) Lists issued by the CIA Office of Current Intelligence. No collector is directed ("required") to collect against these lists; the lists are not addressed to any single collector. Some responsible individuals in clandestine collection (branch chiefs and station chiefs) have refused to handle the PRL's on the grounds that they are "not really requirements," *i.e.,* they are not requests to the clandestine collector for information which only he can provide. In most cases, however, the PRL's are selectively utilized for guidance despite their character as inventories. There are several reasons for this. Revised three times a year, they are the most up-to-date of requirements. Their main subject, current affairs of chiefly political significance, is one which engages the interest and competence of nearly all collectors and which presents opportunities to nearly all. Many such opportuni-

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ties are sudden and gratuitous; they divert no effort from other requirements, hence raise no issue of priorities.

Generally speaking, however, the inventory of needs does not appeal to the busy collector. When he accepts it, it is a sign that adequate requirements addressed to his particular capabilities are lacking. But the collector's viewpoint is not the only pertinent one. The inventory of needs can have great value as an instrument of analysis within the intelligence production office that originates it. The one thing it can not do is to contribute significantly to the resolution of the priorities problem.

The Requirement as Directive

The most broadly controlling document in the field of requirements is the list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives issued annually as a Director of Central Intelligence Directive to which attention is given in the NSC itself. Technically not requirements, and certainly not collection requirements, the PNIO's establish general guidelines for both collection and research. They are ranged in three priorities and contained in four pages. They are comprehensive, authoritative, and community-wide in their application. But because of their extreme generality, the PNIO's provide no practical guidance in settling issues of specific collection priorities. They form a constitution which requires both laws and courts to interpret it. To only a limited extent do present collection directives provide such "laws" or the USIB committee structure such "courts." It is still common practice for individual customer requirements (chiefly of the "request" variety) to claim a priority derived directly from the master document. If conscientiously applied, this practice is sound as a discipline to the requester. But it has no more value in judging the relative urgency of two specific collection requests than citation of the U.S. Constitution would have in settling a suburban zoning dispute.

On the level of collection requirements proper, the *directive* occurs in several situations. The clearest example is where there is a command channel, as between a collection organization's headquarters and its field representatives. Any requirement sent through such a channel is a directive if the higher echelon chooses to make it one. (Paradoxically, by

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euphemism, the fact that command authority is being exercised will often be indicated by the word "request.")

For purposes of this discussion, the most significant type of directive is that which emanates directly or indirectly from the authority of the DCI, or is issued in consequence of agreements between two or more agencies. Typically, such requirements originate outside the collection organization—often through the mechanism of an inter-agency committee—and represent the coordinated interests of major customers. Where requirements of this kind are traditionally and without question accepted by the collection organization and issued with command force to its components, it is reasonable to classify them as directives without looking into the precise authority of the committee concerned.

Directives are most practicable in the following circumstances: (a) where a command relationship exists; (b) where there is only one customer, or where one customer is incomparably more important than the others; (c) where a single method of collection is involved, and where this method has very precise, limited, and knowable capabilities. The last of these circumstances is most likely to occur in collection by technical methods. In such collection, especially on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, directives have been relatively successful. For when it is perfectly clear, as it often is in technical subjects, that it is possible to have this *or* that but not both, it becomes both feasible and necessary to reach a binding decision. In these circumstances, priorities have real meaning.

The situation is very different in some other fields where the need for priorities and hence for directives is felt equally keenly. One such field is the broad area of clandestine collection. Clandestine collection, though distinguished by its methodology, is not a single method but a congeries of diverse methods. Its capabilities are limited, but for the most part are neither precise nor knowable. The demands on it are fantastic. It serves as many customers as there are members of the intelligence community, but is under the command of no customer office. In short, it combines a maximum need for direction with a minimum of the characteristics that make direction practicable. In these circumstances the Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee, which is charged

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with determining priority requirements for collection by the Clandestine Services of CIA, has an unenviable mission. The lists of requirements and targets (IPC Lists) issued by this body of USIB representatives since 1951 form a fascinating record of attacks on the requirements problem, from the highly selective, 18-target USSR list of 1952 to the encyclopedic, 379-target list of 1956, the subsequent selective excerpts from that list, and the worldwide list now in preparation.

The IPC Lists have served various important purposes: they have established goals, provided a basis for planning, and recorded in small compass many of the most critical information needs of the USIB agencies. The IPC has also addressed itself continuously to the problem of priorities. Its primary method has been to relate its requirements for clandestine collection to the objectives set forth in the PNIO's, and to assign each requirement the priority carried by the corresponding objective. This method, and the variations on it, will be discussed at a later point in this paper. It cannot be said to have helped much in solving the concrete problem of deciding what items, among all items that are probably collectible, are most worth collecting at the expense of something else.

The Requirement as Request

Examples of the requirement as *request* can be found everywhere. Most requirements fall in this category, including a large majority of those bearing *RD* numbers in the community-wide numbering system administered by the CIA Office of Central Reference. The fact that RD stands for *Requirement Directive* is historically interesting but not currently significant.

A request may range from a twenty-word question to a fifty-page questionnaire. It may ask for a single fact or a thousand related facts. Its essence is not in its form or content but in the relationship between requester and collector.

An important variant on the request is the *solicited requirement.* Here the request is itself requested, by the collector. The collector, possessing a capability on an existing *general* requirement (of any of the types discussed), informs the appropriate customer of the capability and asks for *specific* requirements "tailored" to it. The resulting requirement is

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drawn up with an eye to the nature of the particular sources to be used, rather than merely to the presumed over-all capacities of the collecting organization. Through this interaction of consumer and collector, requirements of great precision and immediate practical value are developed.

In clandestine collection the solicited requirement is regularly used for legal travelers, for defectors and returnees, and for other sources whose capability or knowledgeability can be exploited only through detailed guidance or questioning. It is the cornerstone of the requirements system managed by the Interagency Defector Committee.

The solicited requirement blends into the *jointly developed requirement*. Here collector and consumer work out the requirement jointly, usually on a subject of broad scope and usually on the initiative of the collector. This too is a practical device of often considerable merit.

The possible variations on the request are innumerable. The unsolicited or "spontaneous" request is the basic requirements tool of the community, the means by which all can seek help from those they think able to help them. The solicited request is a precision tool for relating needs and capabilities. If capabilities were ample enough to fulfill all needs, no other form of collection requirement would be necessary. But needs are infinite, capabilities limited, priorities therefore essential, and some form of directive indispensable.

The Study of Priority

If this description of the *kinds* of requirement is valid, it is evident that each of the three kinds answers a deep-felt need, has a life of its own, and plays a role of its own in the total complex of intelligence guidance. Since the focus of this paper is on the problem of priorities, it must concern itself chiefly with the directive. But while the directive is the only practical vehicle for priorities, requests are also very much in the picture since priorities must govern their fulfilment.

In approaching the priorities question, it is natural to think first in terms of administration and system. Adequate administrative arrangements are in fact essential, and will be

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discussed in some fullness. In themselves, however, they are powerless to do more than make the wheels go round. If the wheels are also to mesh, the question must be studied further as a problem in intellectual discipline, involving analytical method and an appropriate language. Finally, it must be viewed in relation to the training and responsibilities of the individual intelligence officer. Each of these approaches will be examined in turn.

System and Administration

There exists no single, general requirements system. What might be called the requirements *situation* has previously been well described in this journal,[1] but a brief recapitulation will be useful here.

A department or agency which engages in collection primarily to satisfy its own requirements generally maintains an independent requirements system for internal use, with its own terminology, categories, and priorities, and with a single requirements office to direct its collection elements on behalf of its consumer elements. This pattern is characteristic of the military departments. The same requirements office that performs these internal functions (or perhaps a separate branch of it) represents both the collector and the consumer elements in dealing with other agencies.

Where, as in CIA, the consumer components are dependent on many collectors and the collection components are in the service of consumers throughout the community, no such one-to-one system is possible. Each major component (collector or consumer) has its own requirements office. There may also be requirements officers at division and branch levels, as in the Clandestine Services.

Requirements offices differ in many respects, but in all cases they are the official channels for the movement of requirements between agencies. Their personnel are middlemen, and must have some understanding of the problems not only of

[1] By William P. Bundy in "The Guiding of Intelligence Collection," in the Winter 1959 issue (III 1), and, in the narrower context of clandestine collection, by Lowell M. Dunleigh in "Spy at Your Service, Sir," in the Spring 1959 issue (III 2).

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those whom they represent but of those whom they deal with on the outside. The consumer requirements officer must find the best collection bargain he can for his analyst client; the collector requirements officer must find the best possible use for the resources he represents, while protecting them from unreasonable demands; each must restrain his own side from ill-advised intransigence.

Between agencies (or between major components of CIA) the typical requirement moves officially from analyst to consumer requirements office to the CIA Office of Central Reference to collector requirements office to collector. (Even this is a simplified statement.) OCR's community-wide system whereby such requirements are numbered and recorded makes for convenient reference. In some cases OCR also performs other functions normally performed by requirements offices, such as checking to make sure that readily available sources have been canvassed before levying a requirement on an expensive collection system.

Although the vast majority of requirements move officially through the channel just described, many of these movements are merely in confirmation of advance copies which have previously passed directly between the two requirements offices concerned. Matters of substance are regularly discussed by one requirements officer with another. And beyond this there are many instances where one or both of the requirements offices are unaware that a requirement has been agreed upon between analyst and individual collector until a confirmation copy comes through channels.

From the standpoint of the "free market," of bringing analyst and collector together, this way of doing things works well. Where the collection situation is such that effort on a low-priority target does not actually detract from the effort that can be made on a high-priority target, little harm can be done. Or where analyst and collector are both highly knowledgeable and responsible, the results can be excellent. The former condition still prevails in some areas outside the iron curtain; the latter has been attained in certain components. But neither analyst nor collector nor yet requirements officer is competent to set priorities.

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Hitherto we have spoken of requests and directives as clear-cut categories. But it is necessary to take account of a special variety, the *request-cum-persuasion,* and its still more vigorous relative, the *request-cum-pressure.* The intense efforts which are often made informally to induce individuals in the collection offices to give special emphasis to particular requirements are a clear sign that there is a felt need for priorities. But priorities are slippery. Let us see how a typical collection priority is handled on the working level.

The OCR form used for RD's has a place for the requester to check "degree of need" as "standard," "great," or "urgent." If the analyst checks this in a way that is grossly out of line, his own requirements office will probably catch him up; if it does not, the collector's requirements office will balk. But although it may be assumed that the requesting requirements office would not approve an "urgent" rating unless the requirement deserved it in relation to other requirements placed by that office on the same collection organization, no such assumption can be made as to its priority relative to requirements from other consumers. And it would be a very self-confident collector who would try to settle the question unaided.

If the collector should show no interest in a requirement marked "urgent," the requester may try proof, persuasion, or pressure. He may indeed, in anticipation of resistance, have originally indicated a relationship between his requirement and one of the Priority National Intelligence Objectives. He is almost certainly right that a relationship exists, but there may be question of its cogency. It is possible to tie a very small requirement to a very big objective. Early warning is important, but not everything described as early warning is equally important. The collector may still be unimpressed. There is no impartial arbiter, short of the USIB itself, for the requester to appeal to.

Oddly enough, in requests addressed to the Clandestine Services it is unusual for a requester to cite an IPC List. Yet in theory there should be many such citations. The Lists are designed to contain all the highest priority requirements for clandestine collection. They carry priorities derived authoritatively from the PNIO's. Moreover, taken together they

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are more than a hundred times longer than the PNIO's and are crammed with specifics. It would be much easier to *prove* that a request is significantly related to an IPC item than that it is significantly related to a PNIO—provided it actually is.

The chief reason for the paucity of citations seems to be that only a small proportion of requirements received as requests are actually on subjects specifically covered in the IPC Lists. The Lists are not cited for the simple reason that they contain nothing suitable to cite. On non-Bloc areas this is not surprising, since the IPC Lists have scarcely begun to touch them. But on Bloc areas it is astonishing, all the more since the Lists are composed of requirements and targets originally submitted by the very analysts who now make these requests for information. Is it possible that the preparation of IPC Lists is regarded by some analysts as a formal, academic exercise unrelated to the real expression of their keenest interests? Or do the Lists contain only items of such rarity and difficulty that on ordinary workdays nobody really hopes to get them? Or is it that the day-to-day requirements deal with matters so current that the IPC Lists have not caught up with them? Or with matters too unimportant to merit inclusion in the Lists?

Be the answer what it may, the fact is that the analyst in our hypothetical situation would probably appeal to a different source of authority in his effort to show the collector the importance of his requirement. The chances are good that, if he had a case capable of being pressed at all, he would draw support from positions taken by one of the substantive USIB committees that concern themselves with requirements. Among these committees are the Economic Intelligence Committee, the Scientific Intelligence Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee. Each of them is authorized, among its other duties, "to recommend . . . intelligence objectives within the over-all national intelligence objectives, establish relative priorities on substantive needs, review the scope and effectiveness of collection and production efforts to meet these objectives, and make the necessary substantive

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recommendations to the departments and agencies concerned." Each is also authorized "to determine the deficiencies" in its own category of intelligence, "to take appropriate remedial actions, and to recommend to the Intelligence Board remedial actions" beyond its own cognizance. Such recommendations have from time to time been made and approved, with the result that priorities on very specific matters have been established by the USIB. Priorities so established have, of course, the force of directives. And such priorities have frequently been cited effectively in the levying of requirements, although the exact applicability of the priority in the context of a given collector's responsibilities has not always been clear beyond doubt.

It is the intent of this paper to illustrate rather than to exhaust the questions it raises. The requirements situation has many other significant systems and phenomena: the special, closed requirements systems governing technical methods of collection; the Watch Committee with its General Indicator List; and, to name but one more, the Critical Collection Problems Committee, whose recommendations on specified critical collection questions carry great weight with the Intelligence Board. But enough has been said to give a sense of the administrative question.

It would seem to involve at least the following aspects: (a) a vast number of requests with no consistently effective way of relating them to established directives and hence to priorities; (b) directives all of which emanate directly or indirectly from the USIB, but through different channels and without sufficient coordination, so that their impact is often disconcerting.

One sometimes encounters the view that all requirements should be fed into a single mechanism, where the marginal ones would be eliminated and the others properly related, subordinated, formulated, and allocated. The appeal of this dream is that such a procedure would, at least theoretically, deal head-on with the problems of priorities and capabilities, and would ensure that all relevant considerations and interests were taken into account simultaneously by a single responsible authority.

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There are a dozen reasons why such a scheme is impractical. The group charged with this function would have to be delegated an unprecedented amount of the authority of the USIB. It would be unwieldy in size. Its staff would have to consist mainly of substantive experts and experts on capabilities, yet neither of these could be extensively spared from regular analytical or collection duties, and if away from such duties long would lose their expertise. Such a group could not keep abreast of current developments, and much of its output would be stillborn. It is inconceivable that it should take over direction of the self-contained collection systems, or that it could do so successfully. If charged with processing all requirements, its machinery would whir meaninglessly over the many that present no problem and find it difficult to pause for those that do. The priority system would probably be too standardized to help with the really hard and painful decisions. There would be a strong tendency to ratify the obvious and sidestep the prickly.

To encounter these faults and dangers, to be sure, it is not necessary to create this gigantic requirements mechanism. We face most of them already; they are the hazards of all centralized systems, whether large-scale or small-scale. But since we have still so much to learn about how to make priorities work, it would seem sensible to do our experimentation on a scale where the strains are tolerable.

One such experiment might confine itself to requirements for clandestine collection by CIA. These might be divided into directives and requests. The directives would be issued—possibly by a strengthened IPC—under new procedures to be established by the USIB. The issuing body would take advantage of the specialized competence of the substantive intelligence committees, and the latter would coordinate with the issuing body any recommendations to the USIB affecting clandestine collection priorities. All directives and priorities presented to the Clandestine Services (except those received directly from the DCI) would reach them through a single channel and would constitute a single, interrelated body of guidance. Frequency of revision would be essential. Special emergency priorities established through command channels would be possible as they are today. As for requirements of the

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request type, they would be served in much the present manner except that on challenge they would have to be justified by a demonstrable relationship with a directive.

Discipline: Method and Language

The more one reflects on it, the more one sees that the setting of priorities is a singularly subtle and elusive task. Useful priorities simply cannot be caught in the coarse nets of authority, information, channels, and the division of labor. These things are needed, but so also are a disciplined intellectual approach to the subject, comprising a delicate analytical method and, perhaps most important, an adequate language.

To illustrate problems in method, we may draw once more on the experience of the IPC. That committee, as was noted earlier, derives its priority system from the PNIO's. The system consists of three priorities, based on the degree to which the United States could be benefited by the achievement of an objective or harmed by the failure to achieve it. All IPC requirements and targets (the latter being institutions or installations on which information is needed) bear the same priority as the PNIO to which they are related. Since the PNIO's on the Sino-Soviet Bloc are all of First or Second Priority, the IPC requirements on those areas are too. The result is that a list of 300 Bloc targets may have 100 of First Priority and 200 of Second Priority.

There are several difficulties here. One, which the IPC has for some time recognized and tried to overcome, is that two priorities simply do not provide enough span. By various devices—arranging certain related targets in an internal order of importance; describing certain targets as substitutes for others; treating targets as subordinate to "basic requirements" which are sometimes expanded into several paragraphs—the IPC manages to convey a somewhat more discriminating sense of priority.

A second difficulty is that a requirement related to a First Priority objective is really not necessarily more important in itself than another requirement related only to a Second Priority objective. Everything depends on *how significantly* each requirement is related to its objective—how far its fulfilment would go towards achieving the objective. It is illogical to

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suppose that every item of information (or every target) has an importance strictly proportionate to the importance of the objective on which it bears, however minutely. Here again the IPC has recognized the difficulty and has tried to compensate for it to the extent compatible with its system. Where a requirement or target bears on both a First and a Second Priority objective, it is ranged under the objective to which it would contribute more significantly. This still leaves a tremendous unevenness in the importance of targets assigned the same priority.

Still a third difficulty is that a requirement meriting a given priority in the context of total U.S. security interests does not necessarily merit the same priority in the context of a particular collection method. The economic stability of a certain friendly country may be of great importance (Second Priority in the PNIO's), yet may not require clandestine collection at all. This difficulty also has been recognized, and where it is agreed that a requirement can be satisfied by other methods it is omitted from the List.

Unquestionably the difficulties of the priority-allocating process could be illustrated equally well from the experience of other bodies, though perhaps none faces so baffling a task. And the difficulties cited are only a few among many. These are the kinds of matters which appear much simpler before studying them than afterwards. The fact that they are nowhere near solution is one reason for keeping our experiments in priority administration on a medium scale, rather than magnify the problem by creating more grandiose structures.

In order to clarify and refine our method we need a better language. Here the most pressing need is for a common vocabulary in which such indispensable words as *objective, requirement, target,* and *request* can be relied on to mean at least approximately the same thing to everybody. This happy state can not be attained by promulgating official glossaries, but only through continued, careful discussion of common problems by persons from all parts of the community.

As we probe the more subtle aspects of requirements theory, we may find that language itself is putting blinders on us in our search for method. For instance, in the parlance of intelligence direction specific requirements are said to be "derived"

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from general ones which in turn are "derived" from the PNIO's or a similar authority. Is it possible that this concept of "derivation" is really no more than a convenient but misleading fiction; that the specifics are actually thought up independently and, at best, are then *matched* with the generalities? The same process is often described as "translating" requirements or as "breaking them down." It is not suggested that we discard such expressions but that we analyze their implications and limitations. Nobody literally believes that a PNIO of fifty words somehow contains within itself the hundreds of thousands of specific questions that will be asked somewhere, sometime, in the effort to fulfill it. We know that many of those specific questions are not inevitable. Others could be substituted for them, perhaps advantageously. There is indeed a relationship between the fifty-word PNIO and the innumerable small questions, one which admittedly can never be fully charted; but has it been adequately explored? In looking into this particular matter—and here we are momentarily returning from the question of language to the question of method—it would be useful to consider the history of the recently suspended specialized annexes to the PNIO's as well as of a stillborn experiment several years ago by the Office of Current Intelligence in the articulation of a body of intelligence requirements at a middle level of abstraction between the PNIO's and collection requirements.

The final aspect of the language question, and perhaps the most important, is the skill with which requirements themselves are expressed. What is needed here is not different words from those now used, but surer ways of communicating the essence of a matter from one mind (or set of minds) to another. There is no formula for this but a trained alertness to the perils of misunderstanding.

Training and Personal Responsibility

In the last analysis every action is performed by an individual; and in intelligence it is clear that the individual cannot expect to be helped more than half way by systems and methods. This is true in the field of requirements as elsewhere. To adapt a hoary but still valid epigram, requirements are far too important to be left to the requirements officers. In types of collection requiring individual initiative and judgment,

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these qualities must be applied to ends no less than to means. It is pertinent, therefore, to add a word about the role of the intelligence officer through whom requirements are finally put to work.

In the training of new case officers—the second lieutenants of clandestine collection—substantial attention must continue to be given to the interpreting, tailoring, questioning, soliciting, and developing of requirements suited to their sources, as well as to the training, briefing, debriefing, directing and redirecting of sources in response to requirements. The case officer must learn to study carefully the requirement which comes from far-away Washington, to grasp its purpose as well as its letter, to flesh it out with all the knowledge he has or can get, to cable for clarification when necessary, to adapt it to the understanding and the access of his sources. He must also learn to study the reporting as it comes in from the source, and from it to develop his own immediate feedback of further questions without waiting for the customer's reaction.

To illustrate the case officer's strategic position at the crossroads of outflowing direction and inflowing product, the usual image of the intelligence cycle might be twisted into a figure 8, the upper part representing all the paraphernalia of higher echelons, the lower the collection situation for which the case officer is responsible. He himself appears, not on the outer periphery of a vast, impersonal, revolving wheel, but where he feels himself to be—at the center, receiving and giving direction downward, receiving and submitting reports upward, himself deriving and feeding back direction from the reports he receives.

The symbolic crossroads of the figure 8 is equally applicable to the analyst in a consumer office. He too is at the center; he too must communicate upwards and downwards; he too is no cog in a machine, but a mind at work. When the systems and doctrines have been perfected, the job will still have to be done by these two.

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Intelligence negotiates for the services of an obtrusive, demanding, but enormously competent mechanical slave.

THE COMPUTER—CAPABILITIES, PROSPECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS

Joseph Becker

Computers and auxiliary machines for the electronic processing of data are emerging as potentially revolutionary intelligence tools to extend and multiply the human skills of the community. The intelligence agencies have already committed huge sums of money for research and development and the design of advanced systems. Eventually this action is certain to produce radical changes in the ways intelligence information is collected, transmitted, stored, and utilized.

There are two main classes of computers, digital and analog. The analog computer, given measurements of a continuum, notably time, direction, distance, or velocity, processes them mathematically as desired and displays the results in some measurable form. An automobile speedometer is a mechanical form of very simple analog computer; it measures the rotation of a car's wheels and continuously translates this into a miles-per-hour reading on the dashboard. For electronic computation the input measurements may be represented by the voltages of electrical signals and processed by addition and subtraction of these voltages. One fruitful application of the analog computer is in a missile guidance system. It converts measurements of wind and missile velocity, launching angle, position, time, etc., into a chain of output signals for adjusting the valves and control surfaces of the missile. Through a feedback loop to the missile these make instantaneous correction of abnormal trajectory variations. They may also be used to drive a data-plotter on the ground for charting the trajectory or displaying it on a TV screen.

Because they work with measurements, which can never be infinitely precise, the analog computers are less accurate than digital computers, which process discrete numbers. And since

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numbers may be used to represent the letters of the alphabet or verbal symbols, the digital computer is the machine that has the major promise for handling the verbal data of intelligence. It is possible, however, to pass the signal voltages of the analog computer's output through a converter which turns them into discrete numerical quantities in digital codes that can be processed by a digital computer.

The Digital Computer

The abacus is a simple digital computer, using beads to represent numerical quantities and providing a place to add and subtract these and one to store results. With practice a person can do arithmetic on an abacus much faster than on paper. Electronic computers like Remington Rand's UNIVAC or IBM's 700 series provide essentially the same facilities; but they process numbers at speeds measured in millionths of a second, have an immense storage space or "memory," function precisely and accurately, and can process letters of the alphabet when these are numerically coded, treating them internally as if they were numbers.

The really unique feature of a digital computer is what is called its "logic," its ability to choose for itself one of a number of alternative procedures according to the outcome of previous computations. This feature is the one mainly responsible for the notion that digital computers are endowed with near-human or even superhuman qualities. The fancy is encouraged in the vocabulary used by the computer people: you "instruct" and "query" the machine in its own "language"; it "accepts," "differentiates," "searches its memory," "analyzes," even "evaluates." A seasoned computer operator will argue on occasion that the machine has a personality of its own, and his emotional involvement with the machine is such that research is being done in man-machine relationships to arrive at the right mix of human factors for happy and efficient work with a machine as colleague or subordinate. Nevertheless, although it is true that man can evolve ways to make a digital computer perform operations that closely resemble human thought, and although the machine can digest more information than a man and process it faster and more accurately, the parallel with human skills should not be carried past the point of fanciful analogy. The machine does

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not "think"; it is driven through a predetermined set of operations.

Digital computers are used for solving complex mathematical equations, for engineering calculations, for statistical analysis, for experiments in machine translation and information retrieval, and for other precise processing of numbers or letters as in business accounting and banking systems. They also make it possible to run a wide range of tests on sophisticated system simulations called mathematical models. Such a model is a set of mathematical equations governing a system, say an economic system. If the equations used are valid, it is possible, by subjecting the synthetic model to variable data representing impingements on the economy, to determine and analyze the effects of these, and thus to predict what is likely to occur in a real situation. Whereas hand calculations to simulate all phases of economic interaction would not be feasible because of their sheer bulk, the job can be done on a computer in a matter of minutes.[1]

Major weapons systems can be and are similarly reduced to mathematical models in order to help determine their strategic implications. The models, incorporated into computer programs, are put through mathematical war games which test variant opposing strategies, weapons, tactics, logistics, etc., and make possible a rapid evaluation of war plans on a scientific and realistic basis. This is the only comprehensive peacetime test of the effectiveness of military forces, equipment, and resources and of the way they are employed.[2]

The language of a digital computer is usually a binary number system, which substitutes the base 2 for the customary 10 of our decimal system. Instead of running from 0 to 9 before carrying over to a second digit, it goes only from 0 to 1 and then back to zero as it registers in the next position. Instead of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, it counts 1, 10, 11, 100, 101, etc. It is used in digital computers because their circuits, switches, tubes, transistors, and other electronic components are most efficiently designed to have only two alternate states—on/off,

[1] Cf. "Developments in Air Targeting: The Military Resources Model" by Robert W. Leavitt, *Studies* II 1, p. 51ff.

[2] See "Developments in Air Targeting: The Air Battle Model" by Robert H. Adams, *Studies* II 2, p. 13ff.

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transmitting/non-transmitting, magnetized/unmagnetized, etc. There is a simple formula for converting from the decimal system to the binary, but the computer user does not need it: decimal and alphabetical data coded on input media such as punched cards and perforated paper tape are automatically converted to binary numbers on the way into the machine.

Electronic Data Processing

A complete EDP system based on a computer generally has the following components:

Input equipment—devices such as key punch machines and flexowriters for putting the data into acceptable form; machines that convert punched card and paper tape code to binary numbers; and equipment, usually magnetic tape units, to take data into the main storage area of the computer.

The computer, performing all arithmetic and logical operations. Its flexible ability to accept, store, select, and compare data, to calculate, follow logical rules, and release results makes it the heart of the EDP system.

A storage area, containing not only the data to be processed but also the set of instructions—program—governing the entire operation of the system and a place to hold intermediate results for later use.

A control mechanism that electronically supervises and synchronizes the operations of the several machines and provides for manual interruption of the program from the operator's console.

Output devices, those carrying the final results. They may produce punched cards or perforated paper tape, magnetic tape, printouts on paper or microfilm, or TV displays.

Most present-day EDP systems use magnetic tape for input and output. But storage on magnetic tape would entail scanning a reel of it from the beginning to find any particular stored item, and several EDP systems therefore use a different storage medium, say a magnetic disk, in order to provide random access to individual items. Every item on the disk has its own electronic pigeonhole or "machine address," and when the machine is given that address it can proceed di-

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rectly to the item without scanning any other data in the file.

The conditioning of an EDP system to solve a particular kind of problem or render a particular kind of processing is the job of a programmer. He analyzes the problem, makes certain it is well defined, redefines it if necessary, and attempts to preconceive all eventualities. Then, step by step, he meticulously prepares the machine's instructions, using a special set of symbolic notations furnished by the manufacturer along with the list of operations the system will perform. The program thus prepared contains not only the instructions for the computer but directions for moving the data from machine to machine or place to place within the system.

Automatic programming, a recent innovation designed to make programming simpler for the user, is illustrated in IBM's FORTRAN. It supplies a small and rigid natural-language vocabulary—FORTRAN contains only 38 statements and some simple rules of usage—in which the user writes his program. A prepackaged program called a compiler enables the computer to convert these to machine language as its own instructions.

The concept of automatic programming is being taken a step farther by a committee of the Department of Defense. This group is engaged in producing a compiler that can automatically convert a program set up for one manufacturer's equipment to the right form for another's. Each manufacturer of EDP equipment also sponsors a users' organization aimed at pooling the experience and the programs of all for mutual benefit. SHARE, for example, the organization of IBM's 709 customers, maintains a library of programs written by individual members but available for use by any one. This kind of cooperation conserves costly programming manpower and saves time.

Even though computer applications and programming have only begun to scratch the surface of potential capability, hardware technology continues to forge ahead. The main trend is to design faster and smaller computers, an aim that ultimately involves the use of cryogenic techniques—operating temperatures near absolute zero—and microminiaturization of circuitry. The very low temperatures increase the

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computer's switching speeds to a point where the circuits operate with almost no electrical resistance. Microminiaturization is achieved by reducing circuits optically or electronically to their smallest reliable size and depositing an image of the network on the surface of a wafer-thin foil. Very complex circuitry can thus be built into a cube of stacked wafers the size of a lump of sugar.

Looking ahead, designers foresee the day when refrigerated computers the size of a portable TV set will operate on wall socket power. It is symptomatic that one of the serious design problems facing computer engineers is that of minimizing the length of connecting wires, which becomes more and more critical as components get smaller and signal speeds approach the speed of light.

Intelligence Applications

It is clear that these machine capabilities can be applied at a number of points in the intelligence process to improve and accelerate it. Not that computers and other EDP machines constitute any kind of panacea for our ills; they are not glamorous Aladdin's lamps to do our bidding while we recline at ease. Properly applied, they merely provide extensions of human skills, and the calibre of intellectual effort that goes into these applications will determine the net value of the changes now certain to be thus wrought over the next few years in intelligence methods and procedures.

We cannot yet begin to catalog the future points of application, much less describe in just what way machines are going to be used, but we can speculate about some of the intelligence processes likely to be affected by them.

Reporting Media. EDP's first logical prerequisite is likely to be felt in the reporting of collected information. If we are to do any kind of large-scale electronic processing of intelligence information, the natural-language cables and documents that convey it to Washington must be converted to digital form. This could theoretically be done in Washington by manual copying onto punched cards or perforated paper tape or by an automatic optical scanning machine; but retyping is too monumental a task to be considered, and character-recognition conversion machines have not yet been

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made practical. The realistic and efficient thing to do is to capture a suitably coded version of reports as a by-product of their original typing in the field.

Teletype equipment produces such a version on perforated paper tape, and standard-keyboard typewriters can be modified to produce one; the best known tape-producing typewriter is the Flexowriter, in use in many parts of the intelligence community. Its tape can be used to drive automatic equipment for duplicating itself, for producing hard copy, or for telecommunications; and it can be used as input to an electronic data processing system. If such tape were the regular by-product of report typing in the field, it could serve as the medium for electric or physical transmittal to Washington, as the means for automatic reproduction of hard copy for dissemination, and, converted to magnetic tape, as input to an EDP system for automatic indexing, abstracting, and analysis in a central document repository. Experiments are already being conducted in the intelligence community to develop procedures based on getting machine-usable versions of reports directly from the field for immediate headquarters processing.[3]

Dissemination. The fact that a machine program can be designed to compare the words in the text of an article with words in a table in the computer's memory suggests its potential use with an intelligence analyst's "watch list." NSA is experimenting with this notion and developing analyst "profiles" consisting of select words and phrases. These are compared by machine with incoming information, and the matches therein are flagged for the analyst's attention. The Air Force has also developed an automatic disseminator which scans incoming information against analyst requirements in essentially the same way.[4]

Document Recovery. The intelligence officer depends on a central library to supply him with documents he cannot keep in his own files and with lists of documents bearing on any

[3] For the description of such an experiment see "Design for Jet-Age Reporting" by William Earling, *Studies* IV 2, p. 7ff.

[4] See "Developments in Air Targeting: Progress and Future Prospects" by Kenneth T. Johnson, *Studies* III 3, p. 53ff.

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subject he may have under study. The provision of this service is no mean task, with documents being acquired at the rate of about 1500 per day to be indexed, stored as compactly as possible, and made susceptible of rapid recovery in some form suitable for use. Machines are a potential aid in all these three phases of the library problem. The semi-mechanized CIA Intellofax files are now being examined with a view to conversion to a magnetic tape and photographic system, and the Minicard installation in AFOIN uses advanced equipment designed to meet a similar Air Force filing problem.[5] It is hoped that successful machine development will reduce the need for individuals to keep their own files by providing better central service.

Specialized Files. A critical problem with the general document files of a central library, one aggravated as size and complexity require the use of machine methods, is the semantic and projective difficulties in providing precise and comprehensive indexing by subject matter. These difficulties do not occur in some specialized intelligence files, like those for air target data and for name checks, which can be indexed according to unambiguous features like names, nationalities, and locations; and these are the logical ones on which to try the first EDP applications. Air Targets is already using EDP,[5] and for CIA's millions of biographical records used in name checks a special-purpose machine complex with random-access storage and very large capacity is being built in prototype under the code-name WALNUT. Smaller specialized files can be processed with general-purpose EDP equipment currently on the market, some of it accompanied by manufacturer's generalized programs which need be supplemented only by a few punched cards defining the data sought, how it should be sorted, merged, or matched, and in what form the answers should print out.

In these and other applications to alphabetical data one should still not lose sight of the arithmetic capability of the machines. On demand the computer can supply significant statistical data for management planning and action—pre-

[5] See "Developments in Air Targeting: Data Handling Techniques," by Outten J. Clinnard, *Studies* III 2, p. 95ff.

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dicting a file's rate of growth, detecting gaps which warrant increased collection effort, revealing patterns of user interest, etc. The answers can be rendered in a variety of formats ranging from numbers on paper to graphs on a TV screen. The complex reports accounting necessary in the management of some collection systems may be particularly amenable to such a dual attack by machine.

Abstracting. Beyond their evident applicability to the handling of large files, machines have a less obvious potential for performing a number of operations which now burden the human analyst. One of these is the abstracting done as a library service or by individual analysts for their own needs. Computer programs have been written to do word frequency counts of the text of an article, separate common words from those of graded substantive significance—"notion words"—and after some statistical analysis print out the four or five sentences ranking highest in notion words. When perfected such programs will produce automatic abstracts from texts in any language. The Army's Project ACSIMATIC, among others, is experimenting with machine abstracts of ACSI Information Reports.

Translation. There has been a good deal of publicity for the progress toward a machine solution of the bulk translation problem, particularly of Soviet scientific literature. Somewhat sensational newspaper reports have described "breakthroughs" and demonstrations leaving the impression that all machine translation problems have been solved. It is true that an ability to do a bulk output job intelligible to the reader has been achieved. Smooth-prose translation by machine is not yet a reality, however, and may not be for many years to come. Considerable language research remains to be done, and there are still serious questions concerning an output quality adequate for intelligence needs. But progress is being made toward the day when large-scale machine translation coupled with high-speed printing equipment will give wide and rapid dissemination of foreign texts to researchers. The process could also be reversed and used to convert English to other languages for propaganda and other objectives.

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Statistical Analysis. Wherever there is a need to correlate large samples of data involving many variables, statistical inference techniques can be applied with good results, and computers can be used to make the bulk manageable or to speed and improve the work. The economic researcher, for example, who may be loath to apply statistical methods to much of the data he has because it is such a tedious and time-consuming job, will find computers more and more useful in the future, aiding him to reorganize his data quickly into different forms for analytic review. Eventually he may even make a regular practice of devising mathematical models of economic situations and using machines to help him forecast the effects of anticipated changes in conditions.

Photo interpretation is a natural for machine handling because the interpreter usually begins by solving certain complex mathematical equations used in photogrammetry. He needs computations to obtain the precise geographic orientation of his photo and then to get accurate measurement of objects on the ground. It is feasible to store programs in a computer to solve any number of these equations and yield rapid, exact results when given the parameters of the particular problem. Hand calculations may be economical and fast enough while photo-intelligence ground coverage remains limited, but the prospect of tremendous increases in coverage through satellite reconnaissance programs suggests that machines are likely to play a dominant role in the PI process in the future.

The several experimental applications of EDP thus far tried show that the powerful tools of mathematics and statistics can advantageously be used on verbal information through machine processing, which guarantees not only speed but unprecedented uniformity of product by ensuring that prescribed rules are followed consistently and precisely. In time, particularly if incoming intelligence information begins to arrive in digital form, there is good reason to believe that more complex analytic tasks can be undertaken by the machine through the making and matching of logical combinations of words and phrases. Machine correlations may give rise to new hypotheses not suggested by the uncorrelated data. And farther ahead lies the possibility of using machines to perform elementary types of problem-solving.

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Warning Systems

For the past several years the Defense Department has been developing tactical and strategic command control systems. The most widely publicized of these is SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment), an air defense system. Items received by a machine and dealt with in some way in the SAGE system include such things as aircraft availability, weapons availability, base capability, weather, and radar sightings. When hostile aircraft have been detected a manual calculation of the best distribution of weapons and interceptors to meet the particular threat is almost impossible because of time constraints. The computer, however, can calculate distances, compute intercept times, assess the number and kind of bogey aircraft present, and make a weapons assignment within tolerable time limits. In the present system, while the computer handles most of the routine data processing, it is monitored and assisted by personnel who also make the more important decisions on threat evaluation and tactical action.

As in SAGE, other command control systems of the future are being planned so that an array of the information, including intelligence information, necessary for action can be displayed in readily usable form at command centers. EDP machines will be an integral part of such systems because the volume of data with which a commander must deal is enormous and its interrelations so complex that it can no longer be correlated reliably and rapidly enough by manual means. Vast collection programs will back up these new systems, providing intelligence data for their input from radar, ELINT, and other reconnaissance programs, most of it reduced to analog or digital form beforehand.

It seems reasonable to assume that data may some day also be included from non-technical intelligence products such as estimates, broadcast intercepts, communications activity assessments, agent reports, etc.; but these would presumably first have to be computerized to be compatible with the other data displayed for the commander's evaluation. Otherwise this intelligence contribution would be likely to follow rather than precede action decisions. Ideally, the indications intelligence channel should feed information directly and continuously into the command control system to form an integral

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part of the display pattern presented to the commander and provide him with a reliable index of the enemy's immediate intent to attack. Although it does not necessarily follow that today's indications intelligence process should be fully automated to mesh smoothly with command control systems, there is sufficient justification for serious exploration of the possibilities. Since it is already evident that EDP machines are destined ultimately to play the major role in command control, plans for an automatic intelligence relationship need to be laid early in order to ensure smooth parallel development.[6]

Impact on the Community

If we profit by the experience of industry during the past few years we should be prepared for some radical changes in organizational structure as a result of the introduction of machines. The literature is filled with reports of business organizations being turned upside down getting ready to use automatic equipment. There are problems of conversion, parallel processing, work rearrangement, staffing, space, etc. From a data-processing viewpoint, the objective is to achieve a balanced flow of information through the whole organization, and this invariably cuts across departmental lines. It is possible to prepare against problems of this kind in the intelligence organization if it is examined as a total, integrated, functional system. An examination of the necessary scope and the implementation of a coordinated plan will require a time of from five to seven years, an investment that may run into tens of millions of dollars, and the probability of outside contractual assistance.

Another kind of impact is that of machines on personnel. People are wary of the prospect of the machine "taking over," and they set up defenses to prevent it. Perhaps they can be reassured by the fact that the introduction of computers in business, while speeding up information and improving management's control, has neither reduced personnel in number nor replaced individuals: with no experienced pool to draw on for EDP staffing, the pattern has been to do a great deal

[6] For a description of the indications intelligence process see "The Monitoring of War Indicators" by Thomas J. Patton, *Studies* III 1, p. 55ff.

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of internal training of the old staff. But training takes time, and intelligence should be planning an enlightened training program chronologically coordinated with the rest of the change-over effort.

The next five or ten years will be the period for planning and experimenting with machine processing of intelligence data that will ultimately make magnetic tapes as common a form of dissemination as paper. It will be a period of careful and deliberate systems analysis, simulation, and testing. The problem of organizing and manipulating information in intelligence is far more complex than in business or scientific activity. It stands in a class by itself and challenges solution.

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COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS

On Interrogation

Dear Sirs:

I believe that your recent and useful article by Stanley B. Farndon, "The Interrogation of Defectors,"[1] is marred by some oversimplifications, questionable principles, and psychological anachronisms which should be brought to the attention of the unwary reader.

I am sure that many experienced interrogators would find too sweeping Mr. Farndon's assertion (page 10) that the interrogator can best accomplish his purpose "by achieving a harmonious atmosphere and creating a close personal rapport with the subject . . ." Certainly the methods of "unfriendly" interrogation he describes (pages 26–27) are not designed to build rapport. He seems unacquainted with recent scientific research on the psychology of interrogation, in which evidence is accumulating for the hypothesis that the essential prerequisite for interrogation (as distinct from the debriefing of cooperative sources) is the deliberate, controlled regression of the interrogatee. The suitable method for inducing regression varies from subject to subject; but no matter how the effect is achieved or what depth is required to induce submission and dependency, it is this state, not rapport, which the successful interrogator of resistant sources needs to create.

With respect to these "unfriendly" methods Mr. Farndon also fails to make clear how CIA interrogators, at least, are to employ them without violating the provision of the National Security Act which stipulates that "the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions . . ." If, as seems probable, he is describing an interrogation undertaken jointly with a liaison service empowered with executive authority, another layer of complexity is added which should be explained if readers are to benefit from the article. This oversimplification is evident also in his statement (page 11), "The fact that a defector is dependent on the

[1] *Studies* IV 3, pp. 9–30.

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West's good will for his future well-being is a lever which the interrogator can utilize to control him . . ." If the interrogation is such a joint one the person being interrogated may be partly dependent on Western benevolence. But if CIA is interrogating, and if the interrogatee is a hostile agent, he will probably have been briefed by the adversary service about the limitations on Agency powers. Adversary services are known to have told penetration agents not infrequently that they have only to resist—in other words, that they are not dependent on the good will of the U.S. service.

The article draws a dangerously clean line between defectors that have and have not been administratively stamped "bona fide." Thus it says (page 20) that it "takes from one to four weeks to establish the bona fides of a legitimate defector," whereupon (page 23) a positive interrogator "picks up where the CI interrogator left off, and his task is made much simpler by his being able to approach the source without suspicion." The fact is that the bona fides of a defector may remain in doubt indefinitely. "One to four weeks" is an administrative concept, not an intelligence concept, and although interrogators eliciting positive intelligence commonly work without *displaying* suspicion, they no more approach sources without it than any other intelligence officer does. It is a truism that scepticism is the handmaiden of intelligence. "Phase I—suspect; Phase II—clean" would be a foolish postulate. Pursuing this unwisdom, the PI interrogator is admonished (page 24)to be sure that each topic is "thoroughly explored and completed before going off into another area." Methodical, step-by-step debriefing is a joy to the provocation agent who has entered "Phase II." The chances are that he learned his whole cover story in exactly the same fashion. No interrogator, whatever his label, should proceed so mechanically that in effect he merely provides the agent with a refresher course in his own legend.

Mr. Farndon's doctrine on the polygraph is one not universally accepted. He says (page 23), "The polygraph should not be used, however, until the interrogator is certain that he has obtained all pertinent information or has reached an impasse." In frequent practice, on the contrary, it is used as soon as one or two interrogation sessions have provided the

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information needed for the purpose. The lie-detector is basically an interrogator's short-cut anyway, and its use soon after the defector's arrival is calculated to increase its reliability. The purposes of substantiation can be served by a second test at or near the end of the interrogation.

Finally, one wonders about the classification of Slavs into "rational, vital, emotional, and tense" personalities that Mr. Farndon adopts (pages 13–17) from the 707 ECIC's *Guide for Intelligence Interrogators*. Are these concepts based upon scientific and controlled inquiry into the Slavic personality? Or are the four labels the 20th-century reflection of far earlier philosophical speculation?

Keith M. Takerer

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Sketch of a rational plan for language and area studies in intelligence.

THE ARTICULATION OF BABEL

The diversity of opinions expressed in almost any discussion of intelligence work about the extent to which operational officers and analysts need to receive foreign language training reflects, it seems to me, an immaturity in our thinking. Our concept of language training seems not to have kept pace with the maturing of our contemporary American intelligence service, which now has a twenty-year history of global operation.

It is true we have *done* things about spreading language skills. An observer is dazzled by the wide variety of language-area programs set up by the defense agencies since World War II. Viewed quantitatively, the proliferation is impressive; but examined as to whether they promise to satisfy our long-term, world-wide needs for communication with other peoples, these many-sided efforts inspire serious doubts. The very variety of the programs suggests that we have continued the brushfire approach taken during World War II, when our desperate need for linguists dictated makeshift emergency measures like those of the Army Specialized Training Program. At least it shows that we have arrived at no overall answer to the challenge but rather a multiplicity of answers, conditioned by the immediate needs of particular components and by the training philosophy—or lack of it—of different administrators in the various echelons. Each answer can be seen to have its own individual merits, but one searches vainly for any underlying philosophy lending general purpose and direction to the aggregation.

To compound the confusion, particularly in the last two years or so, an affliction that might be called the oriental syndrome has attacked many Americans, symptomized in their belief that our language problem can be solved merely by enrolling as many people as possible in oriental language courses. The application of this theory leads to a demonstration of a

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sort of linguistic Parkinson's law, in which ever diminishing returns are reached by an increasing number of persons who study complex oriental tongues for an ever briefer time. Although we do have a tremendous need for skill in languages outside the conventional West European groups, this need will never be filled by having vast numbers of students dribble away their time in short-term programs without ever reaching functional proficiency in writing, speaking, or reading.

Planning is the answer to the language problem of the intelligence service, planning based on a long-range view of predictable requirements. No group of planners, to be sure, can have the clairvoyance to predict, for example, exactly which of the 800 languages of Black Africa will emerge from obscurity to significance by the year 1980. The plan must therefore have elements providing for flexibility with the changing geopolitical picture, as well as for emergencies. The main features such a plan should ideally have are sketched below.

Concentration on Specialists

We assume at the outset that, although language teaching in the American school system is now improving, thanks in part to the National Defense Education Act, we are still far from the day when we can recruit staff personnel in any numbers with prior real working knowledge of a second tongue. This means that we must be prepared to impart linguistic skills as necessary, but it does not mean that we must furnish equal opportunity for linguistic education to all. For the overwhelming majority of intelligence officers, while a moderate amount of language knowledge may be desirable, even that is not really essential. It is a minority group, the regional experts, for whom language-area training in depth is an absolute necessity. Language may be "good for everybody," but that doctrine as a principle of the training program leads to our frittering away of time and money. Twenty years of experience have demonstrated that the way *not* to build up our linguistic firepower is to put anyone to studying Bulgarian, Vietnamese, or Swahili merely because he "feels like it."

Let's begin our planning, then, with a two-way division of our personnel, separating the area specialists from generalists and others who have no particular geographical concentration. These latter our ideal Language Academy could be pre-

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pared to furnish an intermediate-level working knowledge of one of the major Western languages—German, French, Spanish, Italian, or possibly Portuguese. The regional specialist, on the other hand, whether analyst or operational officer, would be given all-out training, mainly in languages and cultures outside Western Europe, to match and complement his mastery as an analyst of one of the social or natural sciences or his expertise in tradecraft as an operational officer.

The strength in which languages would be covered would be determined through priority lists drawn up and periodically reviewed by a committee administering the plan, which would call in all the interagency and academic support it needed. Among the highest priority languages at present would be listed Chinese, Japanese, Thai, Vietnamese, Burmese, Indonesian, Hindustani, Arabic, and Swahili, along with the no longer "exotic" Russian. At lower priority would be listed Hebrew, Pashto, Persian, Afrikaans, Hausa, and others. Staff personnel would be given every opportunity to express their preferences in language study, but service needs would be the determining consideration; the individual might end up with his second or third or even fourth choice of tongues. Any principle short of this would create a surplus of skills in the popular languages and a deficit in those which lack appeal. Our present overly permissive practices in this respect tend also to encourage a dilettante rather than a professional approach to language.

This clear differentiation between specialist and non-specialist would effect a redistribution of the language-learning effort. We would no longer, for example, conduct a one-year Chinese class for four generalists and two specialists, in which the combined work of the six does not add up to one usable skill. Instead we would have two or three specialists in an all-out language-area program of five to six years' duration, part of it full time. Long before these specialists had completed the full program, they would have enough knowledge and insight to be useful at their desks in Washington or out in the field. At the same time the generalist without prior language equipment could get his innings too, basic training in a key Western tongue. Neither would the concentration on specialists preclude ad hoc linguistic aids and training for

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survival for personnel liable to find themselves stranded in some obscure corner of the world.

From Linguistics to Cultural Command

The language instruction prescribed for the specialist would be conducted according to advanced principles of scientific linguistics, making use of the latest electronic equipment. Oral-aural phases of communication would generally be stressed at the beginning, wherein native or bilingual instructors for spoken drill would be indispensable. Reading and then writing would follow. The area specialist should emerge from this training with an advanced command, short of native proficiency, of the spoken and written idiom.

His study in depth of the language itself would be vigorously backed by intensive and semi-intensive sociological study at the intelligence school, at academic centers in the United States, and when possible in the country where the language is spoken. He would learn to know not only the geography, history, politics, economics, literature, and social institutions of the country but also the informal beliefs, traditions, and ideals which make up the psyche of the society. With this profound exposure he should in time acquire the sort of empathy which makes possible a maximum yield from dealings with a people. He should come to penetrate their culture, an objective unattainable via the mechanistic approach to language exemplified in the tourist manuals, which teach you to parrot such phrases as "Where is the railway station?" or "I feel quite ill. Please call a doctor."

As an example of how this knowledge in depth might be applied, let's take a graduate in Russian from our Academy. A specialist in Soviet economics, he has an appointment to see Comrade Serge Gosplanov, Vice Consul in Paris, on some routine matter. Will he plan to concentrate the conversation, after the official amenities, on coal production statistics in the Donets Basin? Decidedly not. He expects the Russian, if he is true to his culture, to be hospitable rather than brusque, opening the way for the establishment of some sort of personal rapport. Our man will be prepared to chat about how the Dinamo Soccer team is doing and discuss the current chess match in Leningrad. He may compare a recent political development in Western Europe with a similar phenomenon

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during Russia's sixteenth-century Time of Troubles. As opportunities arise he can throw in a few Russian proverbs, so dear to Russian hearts, or illustrate a point with lines from the revered poet Pushkin. Gosplanov, amazed and pleased by the American's feeling for things Russian, is likely to become expansive and may even indulge in confidences about Soviet policies from which he would ordinarily refrain. This kind of communication across cultures can be brought about despite opposing ideologies and national enmities.

Input of Effort

Our planned program will founder in the launching unless there is general appreciation and acceptance of the amount of time and effort a person must put into learning a language. Our experience now enables us to state with some precision how many months of study at a given intensity should on the average be allowed for attaining a given proficiency in any particular language. The romance and Germanic languages of Western Europe are the easiest; they can be learned comprehensively (speaking, reading, writing) in half the time it takes for the Slavic, Semitic, Finno-Ugric, African and other alphabetically written languages, and in a third of that required for those of the Far East that use ideographs.

Out generalist can probably become moderately proficient in German, say, in five months' time if he devotes all his working hours and three or four hours a night at home to it. Or he can stretch it out over 15 months at about three hours of class and study per working day. He will be able to understand most ordinary conversations, make himself understood while living or traveling among Germans, read fairly difficult texts with copious help from the dictionary, and write acceptable personal letters. The *specialist* in one of the easy languages, however, whom we wish to make as skilled as possible short of the virtually unattainable native proficiency, would need seven or eight months of full-time study or almost two years at part time, plus several months' residence in a country of that language. The specialist in Russian needs twice as long, and the specialist learning Chinese at a part-time speed would take about seven years, the last one spent in China.

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That is not all. We shall need a considerable number of specialists who in addition to their primary language can also handle a cognate secondary language or one otherwise closely related. Once the specialist is well advanced in his major tongue the dean of our Academy ought to encourage him to undertake the study of a minor. If he is a Russian specialist, he might take Polish, Czech, Serbo-Croatian, or Bulgarian—or even wander from the Slavic family into Hungarian or Rumanian—to broaden his usefulness in dealing with the Soviet orbit. If he is a Mandarin expert, he might go into Cantonese, Wu, or one of the major Chinese dialects, or elect to do Japanese, Indonesian, or Laotian. The Arabist might choose Hebrew or another Middle Eastern language—Persian, Turkish, Pashto, Kurdish, or Azerbaijani. The Hindustani major could either take one of the other important Indic tongues like Bengali or cross linguistic family lines into the Dravidian Telugu or Tamil.

The aims of the minor could be quite modest, probably limited to an intermediate reading knowledge for analysts or an elementary speaking knowledge for operators, skills they could acquire with six months to two years of part-time work. To this should be added some mild exposure to the culture of the people, in the form of a general survey of its history or literature. This minor program would help solve the problem of providing expertise on secondary yet strategic lands such as Tibet, Ceylon, Turkey, Hungary, Korea, Afghanistan, and even Benelux. For young intelligence officers planning their careers it would not require investing great blocks of time in exclusive study of a minor country which might lose its strategic importance as a result of international political vagaries.

How shall we find qualified and enthusiastic applicants for our ideal Language Academy? Are there stout-hearted men and women willing to volunteer for a rigorous, exacting, and time-consuming program which is certain to interfere with relaxed and pleasant living? Experience shows that just as the armed services usually have a surplus of personnel volunteering for paratroop and other hazardous assignments, intelligence agencies do not lack language-minded persons eager to specialize in regional studies. Motivation for language study is a many-sided and often imponderable thing. Some

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volunteers happen to feel an affinity for a certain language and people; some are moved by ethnic origin or social or marital attachments; some simply want to throw themselves into an off-beat specialty.

Applications for language training should be open to all, regardless of assignment; but selection from them should be rigorous. There should be a leisurely yet searching examination, partly through informal meetings, into the officer's long-term career potential for his organization. Through a battery of psychological and linguistic tests along with personal interviews it should be determined that he has the aptitude and particularly the drive and motivation required. Time and again the utter futility or at least the poor returns from compulsory programs in which certain individuals are *ordered* to study such and such a language are brought home to training officers. While the conscientious person, realizing the value of language to his job assignment, may rally bravely to the challenge, his performance is rarely a superior one when brought about by fiat. Top results are most likely when compulsion from outside gives way to motivation from within, and the student adds that elusive third dimension of devotion which makes for excellence.

Follow-Through

When we have carefully selected well-qualified candidates and schooled them to the required proficiency, our work is still not done. All too often the thousands of dollars spent by a government agency on the training of a man in a much-needed tongue like Russian or Arabic go down the drain for lack of follow-up instruction or any opportunity to utilize the knowledge gained. Although it must be realistically admitted that it is not always possible to send a man to an area where his linguistic training will be useful, it is poor management not to provide at least enough refresher instruction to maintain his proficiency as part of the nation's reservoir of strategic language-area skills. Here our Academy could well borrow from a practice of the armed forces, which insist upon refresher training, at specified intervals, in most military specialties.

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No matter how splendid the training and how dedicated the trainee, our linguistic master plan will still not work unless it is backed by an enlightened personnel management. For one thing, the trainee must have an assurance that he will not be penalized for making the gigantic effort which language-area work entails, that he will not be passed over in promotions because he is a "narrow specialist." This would of course require changing the practice, widespread in government, of reserving the higher grades for generalists with a supervisory knack. Every effort should also be made to create a flexibility of assignment, to minimize the specialist's risk of getting stuck in one geographical rut. In concrete terms, this means that our Chinese specialist should not be doomed to shuttle eternally between Washington and Taipei, but should have opportunities to serve also in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, London, Delhi, and other capitals where large colonies of Chinese make his abilities fruitful for intelligence purposes.

As a corollary of this principle, the rotation planned for the specialist should be aimed at breaking down rather than perpetuating the distinction between analyst and operator. The language-area expertise of our ideally trained operational officer should make him useful also, for example, in the Office of National Estimates or in area analysis in any of the community's research components. At its best the system could produce some number of ambidextrous intelligence officers equally at home in Washington writing a report on the manpower problems of Szechwan province or handling a network of agents from Taipei.

There is a partial historical precedent for the type of program we are describing. In the twenties and thirties the government agencies and the armed services followed the practice of selecting a limited number of "language officers" to be dispatched abroad to study where the language in question was spoken. General Joe Stilwell became in this way a Chinese specialist for the Army. The Department of State sent Charles Bohlen and George Kennan to Paris to study Russian at the Écoles de Langues Vivantes and to rub shoulders with the large Russian colony there. Dozens of other men were assigned to foreign capitals, mostly in the Orient, for language-area training in depth. It is significant that during the

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forties and fifties these men were able to use their expertise in important substantive assignments and take a hand in the making of national policy.

Without some such systematic training plan as herein suggested we run the risk of finding ourselves short of first-rate hands to cope with areas of emerging importance—Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara. During World War II and afterwards we were able to depend on refugees and displaced persons to handle many if not most of our language needs. This source has just about run dry, and at the same time the sweep of contemporary nationalism is creating new nations to be dealt with at the rate of a dozen or so a year. Language planning has become a Herculean task, but a necessary one: the spirit of "make do" and faith in our ability to improvise cannot be accepted as a substitute for a well-conceived training blueprint that allows sufficient lead time for the development of multiple language-area skills.

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Lessons for U.S. intelligence in non-government programs to prepare Americans for selfless or self-seeking missions overseas.

TRAINING FOR OVERSEAS EFFECTIVENESS: A SURVEY

A ground-swell of public interest in giving greater efficacy to American efforts overseas, an interest backed by leading authorities in government, business, religion, and the academic world, has resulted in an outcropping of courses and centers devoted to training for overseas service. More than 30 non-government organizations now sponsor enterprises of this sort. A review of their activities may serve to provide background, both in theoretical approach and in practical methodology, for current attempts to solve the U.S. Government's and in particular the intelligence community's own problem of making its personnel effective while living and working in foreign societies.[1]

Efforts to do something about increasing Americans' professional as well as personal effectiveness abroad are being undertaken with varying degrees of urgency by different kinds of private groups. The missionary group, with its long-standing need to train for proselyting all over the world, remains in the forefront, and some of its old programs are taking on a new look. Business groups are beginning to show an interest in overseas training, although with some exceptions (notably Aramco in Saudi Arabia and the Creole Oil Company in Venezuela) their efforts are still in the exploratory stage. The philanthropic foundations, with sizable groups of Americans going abroad constantly, are of course much concerned with the problem, and each of them has set up its own program. In addition, a number of academic centers and private institutions are coming up with new courses tailored to the specific needs of some of these groups and of government agen-

[1] This problem was pointed up by a confidential OCB report of July 1959 entitled *United States Personnel Overseas.*

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cies. In all this activity there is a veritable ferment of effort to concoct formulas for rapid and effective training.[2]

These efforts are in diverse stages of development. Some are merely plans on paper, for example a project to turn Ellis Island into an amalgamated overseas training school for all interested groups.[3] Others, like the National Training Laboratories at Bethel, Maine, under Dr. Leland P. Bradford, have been running for years. But all the newer programs in "overseasmanship" are a departure from the older courses taught in academic centers for international affairs, which are designed to produce the fully educated man and therefore take years to complete. The new ones simply seek to implant in a matter of weeks, by orientation techniques, a viewpoint or perspective conducive to effective action. While the two are not necessarily in competition, proponents of each often criticize the other, and the "old guard" in each of the sponsoring groups tends to look askance at the new method. Some of the academic centers (Syracuse University, University of Pittsburgh, American University) have recently added new-type overseas training sections to their traditional offerings in recognition of the importance of both.

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[2] Although this survey concentrates on training of Americans conducted in the United States, it should be pointed out that the phenomenon of cross-cultural training is not restricted to stateside programs or to Americans. There is a growing interest in reorienting Americans already resident in foreign societies and in training foreign nationals for work in other countries, including the United States. Indiana University has a training program for incoming foreign students and special visitors from abroad. The Washington International Center of the American Council on Education puts out a *Handbook for Travelers to the U.S.A.* and gives some orientation to foreign visitors. The Instituto Mexicano de Administración de Negocios gives a twelve-week orientation on Mexican life for American businessmen in Mexico City. The British Council of Churches and the Conference of the British Missionary Societies present a one-week course at Moor Park College in England. In Germany there is an Institut für Selbsthilfe at Köln-Lindenthal which trains students for work in foreign areas. Many of the peoples of the world are thus becoming increasingly aware of the problems entailed in functioning in cultures and societies other than their own.

[3] Sponsored by the Committee for an International Institute, headed by William Brennan.

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The purposes of the various individual projects are basically similar: all are concerned with producing effective Americans for dealing with other-culture persons and societies. Within this general purpose each group has its special emphasis—the business group on training a profit-maker, religious organizations on creating an effective Christian, and so forth; but all focus their attention on concepts, skills, or methods that may make for better interpersonal relations abroad. It must be noted that the underlying image of the ideal "overseasman" in all of these programs is suspiciously like the successful person in our own society as portrayed for example by Dale Carnegie—a generally aggressive person with empathic understanding and a hard core of know-how in the manipulation of other persons. This concept, unidealistic as it is, is certainly well received by the American trainee, who can readily refer its role-image to his own experience in American society.

Philosophies of Approach

While the goals of the various programs are thus similar, their ways of arriving at the desired ends differ considerably. Four philosophies of approach, overlapping more or less, are distinguishable, each emphasizing the viewpoint of a particular behavioral-science discipline or combination of disciplines. The viewpoint (and discipline) is usually that of the leader of the program, which in turn reflects the interests of the group it serves.

One such approach is built upon concepts derived from public administration theory, aided by formulae from the behavioral sciences generally. It seeks to answer the question, "What kind of enterprise management is suitable for foreign cultures, or a given foreign culture, and how does one go about setting it up?" The International Operations Institute sponsored by DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired), the pioneer Maxwell Institute of American Overseas Operations under the direction of Dean Harlan Cleveland at Syracuse University, the Johns Hopkins Institute on Development Programming for mid-career ICA officers, and a program for developing overseas executives at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs are guided by this *institution-building* approach.

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A more directly "people-to-people" approach stresses the development of an individual's skills in interpersonal relations, largely a matter of *communication.* The missionary programs and the work of Dr. Edward R. Hall [4] with the Government Affairs Institute in Washington, D.C., take the communications approach, and the Bethel National Training Laboratories program, which seeks to produce the "effective innovator" in various types and sizes of *American* groups, is a variation on it. The Bethel program uses the concepts and methods of education, sociology, and psychology to train for effectiveness in our own society; the missionary and other groups preparing personnel for work in foreign societies lean to the concepts of anthropology and anthropological linguistics. The one stresses psychological universals in human behavior; the other points up cultural relativism and area patterns of behavior. Each has something to learn from the other.

Here a word should be said about language training programs, which although not covered in this survey are an obvious aspect of the communications approach. Most language programs to date have been devoted too nearly exclusively to training in verbal communication, ignoring other media of interaction between persons. But some are beginning to interject value and behavioral concepts, embracing the broader training objective of proficiency in the whole culture of the foreign society in which one is to operate.

A somewhat different perspective from these two is offered by a *value-premises* approach, which concentrates on the basic differences in the attitudes and values that underlie the behavior patterns of Americans and those of persons in other cultures. Anthropology, social psychology, and sociology provide its conceptual materials, which include "cultural relativism" and "modal personality," sometimes called "national character." Professor John Fayerweather of the Columbia University Graduate School of Business considers this to be the approach of his program in training business executives for work in Latin America.[5] He argues that foreign institu-

[4] See his book *The Silent Language,* reviewed in Intelligence Articles III 3.

[5] See his book *The Executive Overseas,* reviewed in Intelligence Articles IV 2.

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tions may be similar in structure to American ones but differ greatly in the attitudes and values which lie behind the structural facade. Dr. Benjamin Paul at the Harvard School of Public Health, whose Social Science Division trains public health workers for community projects in the United States and abroad, reasons that the directives for training in person-to-person communications and institution building follow from an understanding of the value systems involved. Most functionalist anthropologists, including Bronislaw Malinowski (*The Dynamics of Culture Change*), Clyde Kluckhohn (*Mirror for Man*), Cora DuBois (*People of Alor*), and Ruth Benedict (*The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*), make value premises fundamental in their analyses.

From a psychiatric point of view, making oneself effective in a foreign society can be approached as a *personal adjustment* problem. A booklet published by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, *Working Abroad: A Discussion of Psychological Attitudes and Adaptation in New Situations,*[6] typifies this viewpoint. Dr. Lawrence Hinkle's group studying human ecology at the Cornell Medical Center is similarly concerned with individual adjustment problems, especially their pathological aspects. Both contribute a useful biological orientation by showing the importance of physical factors—nerves, muscles, viscera—and relate the adjustment problem overseas, the "culture shock," to that at home, the "nervous breakdown."

Other differences among the training programs result from differences in the needs of the organizations supporting them. The foundations usually have personnel overseas for one tour only, and a short one. Their preparation therefore consists of brief orientations to acquaint the trainee with a specific country. Business, on the other hand, usually places its personnel in one foreign area for a protracted period of time. On-the-job training in the field is most important here, and this is what Aramco and the Creole Oil Co. emphasize. Missionaries, however, like government workers, are often shifted from one area to another after a few years, and hence have in common with them the problem of training to become a "universal man" skillful at adjusting to any environment on

[6] Report No. 41, New York, Dec. 1958.

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short notice (not so incidentally a favorite American self-image).

Variations in Methodology

The training programs differ greatly in method as a result of these differences of approach. As to duration, for example, the Ford Foundation orients in a few days; the Hopkins ICA Institute takes 21 weeks. The interdenominational Meadville Missionary Training Conference at Allegheny College devotes half of its six-week summer course to applied linguistics, on which the Hopkins Institute gives one lecture during its 21 weeks. The missionary programs are strong in emphasizing the other-culture viewpoint, the typically anthropological approach which has been weak or lacking in most of the others. Most programs, however, are now attempting with varying degrees of emphasis and of success to incorporate this "cultural relativity" view.

Some programs, for example the United Presbyterian Church's Institute on Overseas Churchmanship at Stony Point, N.Y., and most business groups' courses, rely entirely on lectures by specialists and supplementary discussions. Others are primarily "laboratory" courses: the Bethel National Training Laboratories organize students into "T-groups" for practical exercises, skillfully blended with lectures. If the lecture courses are presented by academicians (and they often are because of the importance of the behavioral sciences in this training field) they can be successful only to the extent that the academic lecturers are able to apply their scientific theories to the practical field of the supporting organization. Often they have difficulty doing this, lacking knowledge of the practical field. This is no problem, of course, if the specialist is also a member of the practicing profession, as Dr. Eugene Nida and Dr. William Smalley of the Meadville missionary training center are also missionaries, and Dr. John Fayerweather at Columbia is a business professor in addition to being an overseasmanship specialist.

Most of the program directors recognize the embryonic state of overseas training and approach their problems experimentally. The Bethel National Training Laboratories, who have had most experience in the interpersonal relations method, are constantly seeking to improve their programs by a system

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of staff critiques and by using their classes as research laboratories in teaching methods.

However divergent in approach and method, the programs are based in common on the faith that it is possible to inculcate a new, effective perspective in the minds of the trainees, and this new frame of mind which will enable the trainee to analyze his past experience and better interpret his future experience abroad is regarded as their most important product. This gaining of insight, like religious conversions, can be achieved in a relatively short time, and in fairness to the quickie system it must be said that much of traditional pedagogy of the best sort has relied on sudden flashes of wisdom rather than the laborious accumulation of knowledge, although ideally the two go together and "knowledge increaseth wisdom."

The directors, queried as to what factors are most important in developing the new perspective, collectively emphasize three principal ones. First, the personalities of the teaching staff are regarded as of prime importance in firing the minds of the trainees, communicating the desired image to them. Second, the duration of the course seems to them less important than having the concentration of full-time training for whatever period in an environment segregated from the work-a-day American world. Third, methods for inducing the students to grasp actively the new perspective should go beyond mere participation in discussions to include role-playing and other devices for emotional involvement. The critical elements thus appear to be forceful personalities like Dr. Eugene Nida of the Meadville program, special training areas such as the United Presbyterians' center at Stony Point or the Cheyenne Village used in a Montana University program for ICA personnel, and involvement techniques such as those of the T-group at the Bethel workshop. It seems that a course of training overseas in the foreign society, bringing all of these elements together, would be the best of all.

Overseas Follow-Up

Many of the programs viewed their pre-departure orientation as the major or only step in producing the effective American, who then should be tossed into the maelstrom of the foreign society to sink or swim as he had learned his lesson well or

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ill. Several, however, see the training as including at least some instruction after arrival overseas. The post-arrival orientation efforts of the International Educational Exchange Service (the Fulbrighters) with the help of local nationals point the way toward development of continued guidance in the field. Emulating the language and area schools conducted by the State Department overseas, for example in Beirut and Tokyo, the University of Syracuse is also currently setting up a training school in Italy.

A glance at the quarter-century history of the Arabian-American Oil Company's training of personnel for working and living in Saudi Arabia shows changes that may take place in overseas programs as they mature. At first, when Aramco was recruiting many employees who had no area knowledge, it gave them their initial training in an "Arab village" erected for the purpose on Long Island. This school was later removed to Saidon, Lebanon, and then to Dahran, where on-the-job orientation is now given in Arabic language and culture. At present, however, with recruiting at a relatively low level, staff vacancies can often be filled by persons with a prior knowledge of the Middle East. The current emphasis is therefore on an intensive postgraduate course given at Hofof, Saudi Arabia, where students selected from the elite of the company's staff speak only Arabic and live entirely in an Arab culture for ten hours a day over a 14-week period. The classrooms here are real-life laboratories of cultural orientation—the market place where the student learns to buy and sell Arab-style, the tent where he becomes familiar with the elaborate code of Arab hospitality, and the council gathering which shows him the traditional local patterns of decision-making. He also studies written Arabic and does research papers on aspects of the Saudi Arabian social and political scene.

Popularity and Effectiveness

A comparison among the courses as to number of students shows the missionary programs with large enrollments but most of the business and academic ones poorly attended. Two programs scheduled for the summer of 1959 for business personnel were postponed for lack of students. The key reason for this contrast seems to be that the missionary programs

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form an integral part of their students' career development: both interdenominational Meadville and Presbyterian Stony Point are screening centers as well as training areas. At Stony Point the students remain only candidates for overseas positions pending satisfactory completion of the course. The Johns Hopkins Institute also has a potential effect on the careers of its ICA students in that it sends the ICA personnel office reports on their capabilities to adjust to the foreign situation.

The most effective program from the standpoint of student interest and large enrollment is not a missionary one, however, but the Bethel workshop of the National Training Laboratories. It is well organized, and we have noted its balance of conceptual material in lectures integrated with the device for emotional involvement and case role training represented by its T-groups. A major factor in its popularity is that the students are required to study a fascinating subject—themselves—in interpersonal relations. According to Dr. Bradford, the Bethel plan has laboratories in ten universities, Standard Oil of New Jersey is putting a million dollars into the method for the next 10 years of training, and other organizations like General Electric and Red Cross are working with it. The present program is *not* useful content-wide for overseas training—it would train persons going to foreign societies for effectiveness in America—but its methods could be used in a foreign area frame of reference. The T-group also promises to be useful as a device for conducting research on small group interactions in any society.

None of the programs has data on record to validate the efficacy of its methods. Even the Bethel laboratory, with a dozen years of experience, has only anecdotal material to offer in support of its system. Many of the groups are beginning to take interest in getting feedback from the field and are instituting systems for continued contact with their trainees abroad, but none has approached the problem of evaluation scientifically, devising controlled studies of overseas Americans. More generally, there is a decided lack of scientific data anywhere on the overseas American and on the possibilities of training for effectiveness in another culture. A research organization will probably have to be set up eventually to study

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what happens to the American in new environments and to keep abreast of changing foreign patterns of culture.

Although we are properly concerned here only with training, some mention should be made of the parallel problem of *screening* for effectiveness abroad. It is recognized that certain American personality types, with traits often stemming from ethnic group and area background, as well as the personal experience of the individual, are better fitted for work in one foreign area (say the Middle East) than in another (say Southeast Asia); and it may be more efficient to utilize the talents and capabilities an individual has acquired over the years than to try to remake him in a period of a few weeks. The screening systems of the missionary programs and especially of the Hopkins ICA Institute are quite rudimentary, and their effectiveness is a matter of conjecture at this stage in the development of overseas training. Ideally, screening for effectiveness should precede assignment to an area, and training should follow.

Implications for Intelligence Training

Although intelligence training can profit from continued contact with these private programs, their diversity in theoretical approach and methodology, reflecting differences in the needs of their sponsoring organizations, suggests that intelligence should not rely on outside organizations, but continue to develop its own overseas effectiveness training. The Foreign Service of the State Department, the ICA, the USIA, and the MAAG administration have similarly instituted intensive courses in overseas effectiveness. The area courses and training centers established overseas, however, whether by non-government groups or by government agencies, are a most important asset in which we could profitably become interested.

The intelligence program, like these others, will continue for some time to be an experimental one, and it should maintain an open-minded flexibility in training methods. It should borrow useful concepts from all the various philosophical viewpoints, the institutional approach of the public administration groups, the communications and value-premises theories of the anthropologists, and the personal adjustment bias of the psychiatrists, rather than confine itself to the terms of any single

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academic discipline. Beginning with introductory courses and pre-departure orientation, it should aim at a follow-through in the field and additional training upon return from field duty.

A number of techniques used with success in other programs might be adopted in the intelligence courses—the emotional involvement of students through self-analysis in action situations, as in the Bethel T-groups; a problem-game technique used by DACOR's International Operations Institute and the Hopkins ICA workshop; Meadville's use of foreign nationals for research and class demonstrations, but broadened to include not only language but all communications as in the advanced Aramco course; the special training environment and full-time concentration provided in most programs; and an evaluation of individual capabilities and problems in a screening function. As we have seen, the successful programs with high enrollment and enthusiastic support are those that make this training obligatory for personnel assigned to overseas duty. Putting the intelligence program on such a basis would be a step toward ensuring its success.

Finally, although the need for research into the nature of the overseas effectiveness problem may be filled in part by the activities of other organizations, the intelligence program requires a concomitant research and validation activity of its own. Methodical study in depth will demand close cooperation between the field and the conductors of the training program, and a great deal of scientific data-collecting will be necessary before we are on firm ground. This doesn't mean that training programs should wait until the data is in, but rather that research should go hand in hand with teaching.

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The Japanese successfully play back a radio agent from down under.

A SMALL SOUTH POLE

The history of hasty Allied blunders that made the obscure and innocuous Portuguese colony of eastern Timor a victim of World War II [1] has an appropriately dismal sequel in the hitherto untold story of an intelligence operation attempted by the Allies after their invasion of the neutral zone had led to Japanese occupation. Apparently none of the participants has ever set down his recollections of the ensuing Japanese counterintelligence coup and its exploitation for almost two years, but an account of the main events can be pieced together from official records.

In mid-1942 the Japanese were in control of the Timorese capital, Dili, and the coasts; but westward, toward the border with Dutch Timor, remnants of the Australian and Dutch invading forces were still holding out with guerrilla operations. To work with these and to provide intelligence on the occupation forces, a party code-named LIZARD was introduced on 17 July by the Inter-Allied Services Department, a reconnaissance group which had been formed the preceding March and had just come under MacArthur's control as part of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, created on 6 July.[2] By February 1943, however, what remained of the Dutch troops had surrendered, and the last of the Australians, along with LIZARD, were evacuated by submarine. In April the ISD was liquidated. A new body called first Special Operations Australia and then Services Reconnaissance Department was formed.

Birth of Lagarto

Among those evacuated on 10 February 1943 by the U.S. submarine *Gudgeon* were a sergeant of the 2/4 Australian Independent Company (commandos), A. J. Ellwood, and a Por-

[1] See Thomas F. Conlon's "Portuguese Timor: An Estimative Failure" in Intelligence Articles IV 1, p. 91ff.

[2] See Allison Ind's *Allied Intelligence Bureau,* reviewed in Intelligence Articles III 1, p. 135.

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tuguese army pilot who had been the administrator of a large Timorese province, Lt. M. de J. Pires. Early the following summer Lt. Pires was placed in charge of a four-man team under the auspices of the SRD to go back to Timor with the mission of arranging the evacuation of a group of 100-odd refugees, of maintaining morale among the Timorese and the Portuguese not evacuated, of establishing an informant net to cover enemy movements, and of reporting by radio on all enemy activities. As radio operator he had a civilian who had run the Dili radio station before the war, Patricio Luz. The other two members of his team were Portuguese NCO's.

Code-named LAGARTO, Pires' team was landed by American submarine on 1 July 1943, with the assistance of some of the refugees awaiting evacuation, at the mouth of the Luca River. A heavy sea was running, and three radio sets were lost; but on the following day Luz nevertheless established the contact with SRD in Melbourne that was regularly maintained thereafter. In about a month LAGARTO's first mission, the evacuation, had been arranged, and 87 Portuguese, Timorese, and Cantonese men, women, and children were taken out. The rest joined the espionage team.

At this time Sgt. Ellwood also joined the team as a sort of Australian liaison officer. A communications man, he had his own ciphers to communicate independently with the SRD, and Lt. Pires was directed to consult him on all matters and to clear all messages with him. Pires, anxious to minimize Australian participation in his proud services to Portugal and resentful of the authority given a sergeant, ignored this directive. SRD initiated a commission for Ellwood, but his lieutenancy came through too late to be of any use, when he and Pires had long since been separated. It was only by striking up a friendship with Luz that Ellwood could keep track of Pires' messages to Melbourne.

The natives in the area turned out to be unfriendly and assisted the Japanese, so from the very beginning LAGARTO was continually harassed and forced to keep on the move. Moreover, Ellwood reported, the team had grown to the unwieldy size of 34, including Pires' mistress and the pregnant comrade-in-arms of another Portuguese. Melbourne repeatedly asked Pires to cut the party down, but it was not until

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late September, when the team had gradually lost all its rations and spare arms and ammunition, that he got it down to eight, still including his mistress. When things became critical he requested an evacuation, but too late; the Japanese were now closing in.

On 29 September 1943 natives completely surrounded the party and stood guard until the Japanese came up. Ellwood, without dry matches, couldn't burn his cipher and other papers, but he scooped out a hole in the sand and buried them. Luz and two others managed to get away, the latter for only a few days, Luz for the duration; SRD heard from him through Portuguese consular channels in December 1945. The rest were loaded into a truck and taken to Dili to a military jail. There Ellwood, kept tied and handcuffed, could hear the cries and screams of the others, but he never saw any of them again. He himself was alternately questioned and beaten by four Japanese.

Nippon Takes Over

The Japanese first got hold of Pires' emergency cipher. On 6 October they sent a message to SRD saying Luz had run away from LAGARTO. The same day, however, having found Ellwood's buried papers, they beat him into agreeing to operate his set. He was in such bad shape that a Japanese operator had to guide his hand to the transmitting key. His message gave a plausible position for LAGARTO and said they had been without food for three days. Melbourne replied with arrangements for a food drop and asked whether it was true that Luz had disappeared and who was operating. On 7 October Ellwood confirmed that Luz had run away and said that he was operating for Pires, who had also lost his cipher book.

SRD, all innocent of suspicion, thus began a series of supply drops that was to go on for 22 months. The Japanese would take Sgt. Ellwood to the drop zone and have him aim the signal lamp while they operated it from cover close by. For his cooperation Ellwood was finally allowed two sets of clothing, his mail, and one magazine per month from the drops.

The flow of messages from LAGARTO from this time on gave the impression that it was gradually getting on a friendly basis with the natives and establishing itself in the country.

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It reported the team moving about for a time and then finally settling some 20 miles east of Dili, where it remained ostensibly unmolested until July 1945. A careful study of these purported early movements might have raised an eyebrow in Melbourne: the team was said to have retraced its steps into the very area where it had previously reported the natives most unfriendly and unwilling to help in any way. But SRD never even inquired how LAGARTO had managed to get itself out of the crisis it had reported just before capture.

Cobra Entrapped

With LAGARTO apparently well established, SRD used it to protect the insertion of additional teams. Arrangements were made for the first of these, code-named COBRA, to be sent in on 29 January 1944. The Japanese took Ellwood with them to the entry point. Having obtained dry matches and materials to make a flash lamp, he intended to escape and warn the new team before it landed. He made a break, but his guard shouted to attract the attention of the other Japanese and he was soon recaptured, being ill with beri-beri. After a severe beating he was blindfolded, gagged and bound, and left without food or drink in the open for forty-eight hours. Then he was returned to Dili and put on a starvation diet that brought back his malaria and dysentery. He learned that the incoming team had been captured within an hour.

Melbourne, asking LAGARTO what happened to COBRA, gave it the code word COBRA was to use if it was in difficulty and the authenticator that would indicate it was safe and free of enemy control. With the help of this information the Japanese got the use of COBRA's communications and in a few days began sending messages over that channel also. A third team, sent in ten months after LAGARTO's advice about the entry point was asked, was apprehended within a few hours.

The Play Ends

At the end of 1944 control of the teams passed to a Group D in SRD, established in Darwin at the Lugger Maintenance Station. The turnover was accompanied by no word or hint that anything might be wrong. A full counterintelligence review by Group D would not have been possible anyway: the message files of LAGARTO and COBRA were incomplete with

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respect to the early months of both. Melbourne, although asked to supply copies of the full files, would not or could not do so.

In April 1945, however, intercept intelligence reported that a copy of an AIB questionnaire dropped to both teams in January and February was in Japanese hands on Timor. A plan for relief of LAGARTO, which it was now suspected might also be known to the Japanese, was changed without informing the team, and the relief team leader was parachuted into the area two days before a scheduled supply drop. When the drop was made he observed from concealment that Ellwood was under guard at the drop zone. But it was now July, and by the time he made his way back to Australia the war was over.

On 21 August Ellwood was removed from his solitary confinement and taken to another prison, where he was housed with the leader of ill-fated COBRA, a Lt. Cashman. On 1 September 1945 all the surviving SRD prisoners were moved to Flores, Soembawa, Java, and Bali, where they were picked up by aircraft of the RAAF and flown to Singapore on 2 October.

The last messages had been sent over the COBRA and LAGARTO links on 12 August 1945. They read respectively:

> FOR ACB FROM NIPPON. THANKS FOR YOUR INFORMATION THIS LONG WHILE. NIPPON ARMY.
>
> NIPPON FOR LMS. THANKS YOUR ASSISTANCE FOR THIS LONG WHILE. HOPE TO SEE YOU AGAIN. UNTIL THEN WISH YOU GOOD HEALTH. NIPPON ARMY.

This operation carried out so successfully by the Japanese was on a much smaller scale than the similar North Pole deception achieved by the Germans at the other end of the world.[3] There is no evidence available that any information passed to the Australians by the Japanese over the compromised circuits did any lasting harm. Nevertheless, it meant the total cancellation of effective reconnaissance in this particular area and the fruitless expenditure of considerable equipment and personnel tied up in supporting the teams.

[3] See Herman J. Giskes' *London Calling North Pole* (New York, 1953).

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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY IN WORLD WAR II

THE HOUSE BUILT ON SAND: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia 1939–1945. By *Gerald Reitlinger*. (New York: The Viking Press. 1960. Pp. 459. $6.95.)

Mr. Reitlinger might more accurately have made his subtitle The *Lack* of a German Policy in Russia, for his book documents in detail the want of any Nazi master-plan for the conquered areas and peoples of the Soviet Union. Hitler had some vague thought of germanizing European Russia with colonists and moving most of the heterogenous nationality groups to Siberia. Goering, in his capacity of economic and manpower czar, sought from occupied Russia only tremendous exports of food and the exploitation of skilled labor. Himmler's SS was devoted to the task of executing all Soviet officials as well as exterminating the Jews, and its Einsatz Kommandos did both with appalling ruthlessness. Rosenberg's impotent Ministry for Occupied Territories had no particular policy and was constantly at odds with both the civilian and the military administrators. The Wehrmacht was mainly interested only in getting on with the war; few of its senior officers opposed the inhuman treatment of the conquered peoples. And lastly, the intelligence components of the Wehrmacht, Abwehr, and SS played a considerable role. The result of the combined activities of all of these agencies and factions: chaos.

Reitlinger devotes the major part of his work to what he calls the "colonialism" with which the occupied territory was administered, and what seems an excessive proportion of this is concerned with the feud between Rosenberg and Erich Koch, Commissar for the Ukraine. Partisan and anti-partisan activities are mentioned throughout, but there is a disappointingly brief section devoted exclusively to the partisans. The last quarter of the book deals with the "political crusade"—the formation of national legions, the recruitment of eastern troops for the German army, and the institution of the Vlasov Army.

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A good research job, Reitlinger's study will be a valuable secondary source on German efforts in political warfare, guerrilla warfare, and intelligence operations in the USSR from 1941 to 1944. It presents cogent object lessons illustrating the fact that unconventional warfare of all types must be closely aligned to a national policy and consistent objectives if it is to have any chance of success. Although Germany, even if it had sought to make the Russian people its allies from the start, did not have the military or industrial strength or the leadership needed to defeat the Communist regime, the record of its performance here forms a magnificent case history showing how not to govern occupied areas and revealing a national mis-estimate of the Soviet Union. Reitlinger's extensive footnotes will assist those who desire to delve deeper.

LIFE AND DEATH OF THE LUFTWAFFE. By *Werner Baumbach,* General of the Bombers. Translated by Frederick Holt. (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. 1960. Pp. 224. $4.50.)

Werner Baumbach was one of the Luftwaffe's original bomber pilots who lived to become General of the Bombers when there were very few bombers left. He survived not only the hazards of air action but also those entailed in the many sharp criticisms of the Luftwaffe's high command which he apparently did not hesitate to make as the tide of the air war turned against Germany. He was a close friend of Ernst Udet, World War I pilot and Air Quartermaster General in World War II, of Jeschonnek, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, and late in the war of Production Minister Albert Speer. After the war he emigrated to Argentina, where he was killed in a plane crash in 1952.

This book, a posthumous combination of history, autobiography, and philosophy unskilled in all three fields, is less than the Luftwaffe deserves. The factual quotations from the author's diary are mingled with others that range from flowery philosophizing to comment on Goering's decadent entourage. Yet quite a few items of interest to the intelligence officer can with diligence be found in these haphazard reminiscences.

Chapter II, "Pre-War Strength of the Air Powers," purports to be a German General Staff analysis of the air strength

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of the United States and the European powers. Among the interesting historical footnotes in the book is the revelation that when Hitler returned to the Rhineland in 1936, Germany had a single unarmed squadron of biplane fighters! The mass production of planes soon began, but as early as 1940, by Goering's own decision, experimental work in new aircraft was practically stopped, reduced to such a level that in 1945 the German fighters were outclassed by those of the Allies.

In Chapter XVI, "Where Were Our Fighters?" there is a brief report on the debate whether Germany should emphasize the production of jet fighters such as the Me 262. Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler's insistence that production concentrate on bombers, even after it was obvious that fighters were needed to defend Germany, resulted in a lack of any decision and a dissipation of aircraft production. Udet in 1941 warned that if the fighter arm was not strengthened the war would be lost. But "the heads of the armed forces regarded the air arm as an auxiliary weapon in the land and sea war," and "it was widely believed that the protection of the home country could be left to the anti-aircraft guns in conjunction with a few fighter wings." Hitler was so obsessed with the idea of an offensive war that he ignored the threat of the allied strategic bomber offensive.

But these poor estimates with respect to defense were not compensated in offensive strength. The air war against England failed, says Baumbach, because British fighters were superior to German bombers, because the German fighters could not provide cover, and because the aircraft, bombsights, and armament were inadequate for the job. "German air-sea warfare," moreover, "was a system of expedients, expedients imposed by the enemy." In the production of the guided missile, "the wildest confusion prevailed. . . . We had a fully developed weapon but could not produce it in quantity and employ it."

Baumbach implies that after a visit to the Soviet Union in 1940 he made the statement that Russia could not be conquered on land; he is imprecise as to whether that was really part of his report or a post-war afterthought. He goes on to say that the Air Staff always rejected or minimized intelligence reports on Soviet air strength. Radar in the Luftwaffe was also "the affair of intelligence," but Goering's deputy

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Milch did not like General Martini, the head of intelligence, and neither of them paid attention to the development of radar; the Allies left them far behind.

It remains for some scholarly historian to shape this and other material into a real "life and death of the Luftwaffe." But here is enough to warn any nation of the fate invited by a divided command, dispersed authority, the personality cult, and the ignoring of intelligence.

BLACK SATURDAY: THE DEATH OF THE ROYAL OAK. By *Alexander McKee.* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1960. Pp. 211. $3.95.)

On October 14, 1939, less than six weeks after the outbreak of World War II, the British battleship *Royal Oak* was sunk with the loss of 833 men while at anchor in the supposedly impregnable naval base of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys. Although it was of the ancient *Royal Sovereign* class built in 1913–1914, the loss of the *Royal Oak* was a severe one to the British Home Fleet, hard pressed as it was to contain the efforts of the German commerce-raiders both above and below the surface. Almost immediately after the sinking the Germans announced that it had been the U–47, commanded by Gunther Prien, that had penetrated Scapa Flow and done the job, and shortly after the war a story appeared describing how the feat had been made possible by a German agent in the Orkneys who informed Berlin of weaknesses in the submarine defenses of the naval base.

Mr. McKee's book is an attempt to discredit this generally accepted version of the sinking and show that there was no German submarine and no agent, that the *Royal Oak* sank as a result of internal explosions. He bases his case on interviews with a number of the survivors and an analysis of German naval records, including Prien's exaggerated report. He did not gain access to British Admiralty reports and presumes that these files are still kept secret in order to conceal the sabotage or accidental explosions.

His arguments are unconvincing. His sources, interviewed when many years have blurred their memories of what must have been at best a bewildering experience, are largely rather low-rank survivors; the ranking officers who lived apparently

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either didn't know much or weren't talking. The firmest pertinent evidence on the case is first, that the submarine defenses were in fact weak—another blockship was en route to fill a known gap—and second, that the greatest fear was an air raid. The base had been subjected to German aerial observation, and on October 17 it was actually raided.

Until the Admiralty opens its files there may be some mystery about this event. But Winston Churchill, who has a fair reputation as a historian, says on page 489 of *The Gathering Storm,* "A German U-boat . . . sank the battleship Royal Oak as she lay at anchor."

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BRITISH WARTIME OPERATIONS

THE GREATEST RAID OF ALL. By *C. E. Lucas Phillips.* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1960. Pp. 270. $4.95.)

On the night of March 27-28, 1942, British commandos and naval elements raided the port of St. Nazaire, which was heavily fortified and guarded by German ground, air, and naval forces. At a loss of 169 killed, the raiding party—611 men in small, virtually unarmed vessels—succeeded in putting out of action for the duration of the war (in fact for a full ten years) the giant "Normandie" dry dock, the only repair facility on the Atlantic coast that could handle the German battleship *Tirpitz.* This action, as had been planned, forced the recall of the *Tirpitz* to northern waters, where she was eventually caught and sunk. The exploit was called by Lord Louis Mountbatten the war's finest and most profitable combined operation, by Winston Churchill "a deed of glory intimately involved in high strategy."

Mr. Phillips' account of the St. Nazaire raid is an excellent study in intelligence and paramilitary action. He describes at length the meticulous care with which it was planned on the basis of sound intelligence. It encountered only a few unexpected gun emplacements. A fine example of the combat use of good basic intelligence, pertinent current intelligence, and—perhaps most important of all—a sound estimate of enemy reactions, the audacious gamble succeeded because of this kind of preparation and planning, because the security precautions were excellent, because of good provisions for cover and deception, and of course because it was carried out with magnificent aggressiveness and courage—five Victoria Crosses!

Although not written for the instruction of combat intelligence and paramilitary officers, *The Greatest Raid* should be required reading for them.

PIN-STRIPE SABOTEUR. By *C. Wighton.* (London: Odham's Press Ltd. 1959. Pp. 256. 18/—.)

This the story of "Robin," an important British agent in France and Switzerland from 1940 until 1944. Although the

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author does not tell all, his book still contributes significantly to the history of covert intelligence and intelligence-related operations during the war. Robin's activities ranged the clandestine keyboard from intelligence collection in the early years to major sabotage and paramilitary operations toward the end. Although all of his important cohorts were eventually captured, Robin himself was never taken by the Germans. A good case could be made for the view that this remarkable "luck" was a product of his mental brilliance, flinty courage, and well-developed sixth sense rather than any fortuitous gift apart from these qualities. Most of his activities were well organized, reflecting his wise devotion to the principle of economy of force. His major accomplishments included important breakthroughs in the collection of intelligence linking the German long-range rockets to Peenemunde and the procurement of secret timetables for military trains on the critical railroads of northern France.

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EVASION AND ESCAPE

THEY CALLED ME ALFRED. By *Friedrich Wetzel.* (London: George Ronald. 1959. Pp. 237. 15/—.)

The author was a German who in the early 1930's participated in the formation and activities of an anti-Hitler underground movement in and around Stettin. As the Nazis made their drive for power the opposition was relatively strong in numbers but weak in unity, leadership, and purpose, all too prone to adopt a "let George stop Hitler" attitude. Wetzel was among those who realized that it would not do to wait for leadership and believed that a grass-roots movement of millions of determined people could stop Hitler. Those who shared these views were too few and too late, unfortunately. Captured by the Gestapo and tortured, he escaped and made his way to freedom, narrowly missing recapture when the Germans took over Czechoslovakia in 1938. His book includes a good description of his covert cross-country march from central Czechoslovakia over the Beskids to Poland, a route that led ultimately to London and a new life.

FROM CAPRI INTO OBLIVION. By *Adrian Gallegos.* (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1959. Pp. 256. 16/—.)

This well-written World War II book is the story of a British Naval Reserve officer, Chief of the Advanced Naval Section of Special Force No. 1, who was captured by the Germans in Italy and regained his freedom after spending some 13 months behind enemy lines. The account of his evasion in Italy treads book-saturated ground, but other parts of the story are unique, for not many men escaped from Germany via Austria and Italy. More important than any other factor in the author's successful escape was his command of foreign languages. This skill also enabled him while serving in North Africa to capture three escaped German POW's by detecting their slightly foreign French accent. His own escape enabled him to bring back much valuable intelligence on German war plants, military installations, partisan movements, etc. He could have brought back more if he had been briefed: he notes that he did not realize how many aspects of life in enemy territory were of intelligence interest.

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SEQUEL TO BOLDNESS. By *Richard Pape.* (London: Odham's Press Ltd. 1959. Pp. 256. 18/—.)

This rambling, disjointed, sometimes moving book follows up the author's earlier account [1] of his World War II escape and evasion experiences in Europe. Although it contains a good deal of data in the escape and evasion category and on clandestine activities in general, much of the material is merely a warmover from his original account or has been covered in greater detail in other works. The author's purpose in *Sequel* is to trace the fortunes and misfortunes of those who aided his evasion and in several cases paid dearly for their kindness. "Can I and should I forgive and forget?" is the question around which the story follows an erratic orbit. Slowly and painfully, after talking to many who forgave and forgot with little reason for doing so, Pape finds the answer to be "yes."

OFFICIAL SECRET. By *Clayton Hutton.* (London: Max Parrish. 1960. Pp. 195. $3.75.)

The subject of this book is the development and production of evasion and escape aids for British military personnel during World War II. More precisely, it recites the author's role in this program.

Useful as many of these items were at the time, there is no longer anything novel about maps printed on silk, miniature compasses, condensed rations, flexible saws, and the like. As the author admits, even the methods used to conceal these items have long since been revealed and thereby compromised for future use.

Containing nothing of value to present-day intelligence, the book is also a tiresome one: the author's main purpose seems to be the establishment of his bona fides as a 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week genius. You don't have to take his unblushing word for this; he also supplies testimonials.

The title "Official Secret" is intended to be ironical. The author devotes the last 36 pages to describing his frustrations in getting official clearances to tell his story. We agree with him that no security is breached in the telling.

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[1] *Boldness Be My Friend.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954.

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MISCELLANY

CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE. By *P. Eaton* and *J. Leasor*. (London: Angus and Robertson Ltd. 1960. Pp. 239. 18/—.)

An interesting rundown on two of the great misplaced treasures of World War II, one consisting of Yugoslav bullion from the vaults of a Zagreb bank and the other, the so-called "Rommel treasure," comprising gold and jewelry collected by German forces in North Africa. If the facts assembled by the authors are approximately correct, the movements of the two weave fantastic patterns of misfortune, coincidence, treachery, and puzzling silence. The Rommel treasure moving northward and the Yugoslav generally westward, they seem incredibly to have been lost at approximately the same place along the east coast of Corsica, although no one intended this place as a destination for either hoard. Many people who could supply missing pieces of the puzzle are now dead, but the mystery is far from dead; further searches will be made and more lives lost and more books written ere it is laid to rest.

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SECRET [redacted] 25X1

Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected. The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents preceding page 1.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are those in the following categories:

German intelligence and policy . . . . . LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK

Evasion and escape . . . . [redacted] 25X1

SECRET [redacted] 25X1
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